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SUMMARY
A cyber-security problem is a conflict-resolution scenario that typically consists of a
security system and at least two decision makers (e.g. attacker and defender) that can
each have competing objectives. For example, the objective of one decision maker (e.g.
defender) could be to ensure that the security system operates at or above some threshold
level of performance, while another decision maker’s (e.g. attacker) objective could be to
ensure that the system operates below this threshold. From the standpoint of a security
researcher or practitioner, some questions of interest about the system are the following.
How will the security system perform over time? What will be the likely behavior of the
key decision makers that control/influence the system? How does information asymmetry
affect the behaviors of each decision maker? Answers to these questions can lead to better
system designs, better understanding of the system itself, and improved decision making
ability by security professionals.
In this thesis, we are interested in cyber-security problems where one decision maker
has superior or better information. Game theory is a well-established mathematical tool
that can be used to analyze such problems and will be our tool of choice. In particular, we
will formulate cyber-security problems as asymmetric information games, where game-
theoretic methods can then be applied to the problems to derive optimal policies for each
decision maker. We will consider asymmetric games where the state of the world remains
fixed over time (repeated games) as well as games where the state of the world can change
from stage to stage according to a transition that is dependent on the current state and
the moves of both players (stochastic games). These optimal policies can then be used to
predict the likely behavior of the decision makers and the performance of the system.
A severe limitation of considering optimal policies is that these policies are computa-
tionally prohibitive for repeated and stochastic asymmetric information games. In asym-
metric information games, the computational complexity grows exponentially with respect
x
to the number of game stages. We address the computational limitations for repeated games
and stochastic games in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively by considering suboptimal policies
based on the ideas of model predictive control. A key property of the policies is that they
remain computationally tractable as the number of game stages increase.
The contributions of this thesis are the following. For the repeated games, we intro-
duce policy improvement methods for computing suboptimal policies that have tight per-
formance bounds. We prove that the method’s performance converges asymptotically to
optimal with respect to the number of game stages. We also show that the improved policy
can be computed by solving a linear program online whose complexity is constant with
respect to the game length. Similarly, for the stochastic games, we derive bounds on the
performance of the policy improvement methods and show that the policy can also be com-
puted by solving a linear program online. We then demonstrate in Chapter 5 how the policy
improvement methods can be applied to cyber-security problems to reduce the computa-




Society’s critical infrastructure, which include its government, its military, and its busi-
nesses, rely on networked systems to function in a satisfactory manner. As a result of this
reliance, networked systems have been a target of social groups that include criminals, for-
eign countries, and “hactivists1.” Before these groups began to proliferate in the digital
era and before networked systems became the lifeline of modern civilization, there were
hackers whose objective was to break into computer systems for the challenge; there were
no profit motives in it for them. As a consequence, companies and industries placed few if
any resources into cyber security. In fact, one of the few areas where substantial resources
were placed was cryptography.
Modern cryptography is a subset of cyber security that has since its infancy been math-
ematically grounded. A particular example is a public key encryption algorithm developed
by three professors (Rivest, Shamir, and Aldeman) at MIT [1]. 2 The encryption algorithm,
RSA, is based on number theory and relies on the premise that it is computationally in-
feasible to factor large prime numbers. Cryptography has progressed to a point that cyber
hackers almost aways avoid attacking the algorithms directly [2]. Instead, hackers seek out
alternative attack vectors that they are more likely to attack successfully. These alternative
attack vectors consist of targeting aspects of the security system that are often based on
heuristics instead of established mathematical theory. In light of the recent security threats
that have impacted governments as well as businesses, an increasing emphasis has been
placed on finding ways to mathematically ground other aspects of security outside of cryp-
tography [3]. It is hoped that through this process security systems will be more secure and
predictable.
1Anonymous is an example of a hactivist group whose goal is to attack cyber systems to make political
statements.
2Diffie and Helman were the first to publish the public key encryption concept.
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In this thesis, we consider developing mathematical models of security systems to an-
alyze the system’s performance and to predict the likely behavior of key decision makers
that influence/control the system.3 In particular, we are interested in the scenario where one
decision maker (e.g. attacker ) has superior information and seeks to actively conceal his
knowledge when it is optimal to exploit the uncertainty of the other decision maker (e.g.
defender). The uninformed decision must therefore use her current observations to improve
her uncertainty so that she can make better decisions going forward into the future.
A mathematical model of a given cyber system can be used to formulate a security
scenario into a strategic game with asymmetric information. Game-theoretic methods can
then be used to derive optimal policies for each decision maker under zero-sum assump-
tions, and these policies can be used to predict the likely behavior of the decision makers
and the performance of the system [4]. Since the derivation of optimal policies is computa-
tionally prohibitive [5], the theoretical contribution of this thesis is to consider suboptimal
policies that are based on the ideas of model predictive control. Specifically, we establish
tight lower bounds on the performance of the suboptimal polices, and we show that these
policies are computationally feasible4.
In the first half of the thesis we will discuss asymmetric information games. This dis-
cussion will include both repeated games and stochastic games, where the state of the world
remains fixed in repeated games and the state can change during game play in stochastic
games. In the second half we will discuss actionable cyber-attack forecasting. The objec-
tives of actionable cyber-attack forecasting are to learn an attacker’s behavioral model, to
predict future attacks, and to select appropriate countermeasures to prevent future attacks.
We will also demonstrate in the second half of the thesis how the computational results
of the first half of the thesis can be used to reduce the complexity of cyber-attack forecast
models.
3These decision makers are typically attackers and defenders.
4The computationally complexity of the optimal policies grows exponentially with respect to the number
of stages of the game. In contrast, the complexity of the suboptimal policies remains constant.
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1.1 Asymmetric Information Games
1.1.1 Repeated Games
In repeated zero-sum games, two players repeatedly play the same zero-sum game over
several stages [6], [7], [8]. We assume that while both players can observe the actions
of the other, only one player knows the actual game, which was randomly selected from
a set of possible games according to a known distribution. The dilemma faced by the
informed player is how to trade off the short-term reward versus long-term consequences
for exploiting her private information, since exploitation can reveal the true state of the
world [9]. Seminal work by Aumann and Maschler [10] derives a formulation for the value
of the game, which quantifies the exploitation tradeoff, and also derives optimal policies
for the informed player. Using this formulation to compute explicit optimal policies for
games with multiple stages is computationally prohibitive.
We address the complexity issues of repeated games by deriving a suboptimal policy
based on the concept of policy improvement. Policy improvement consists of first consid-
ering a policy whose performance is known or can be readily computed. This initial policy
is sometimes referred to as a baseline policy. Next, a candidate policy is selected from
some policy set. If the current candidate policy performs better than the baseline policy,
the candidate policy becomes the new baseline policy. This knew baseline policy is an
improvement over the previous baseline policy, hence a policy improvement. This process
can continue in an iterative manner. If the policy set is finite, then an optimal policy with
respect to the set can be found in a finite amount of time.
The baseline policy we consider for asymmetric games is a non-revealing policy, i.e.,
one that completes ignores superior information. An important characteristic of the non-
revealing policy is that it is readily computable. The improved policy, which is imple-
mented in a receding horizon manner, strategizes for the current stage while assuming a
non-revealing policy for future stages. We derive bounds on the guaranteed performance of
3
the improved policy and establish that the bounds are tight. We then prove that the perfor-
mance of the policy improvement methods converge asymptotically to optimal with respect
to the number of game stages. Last, we show that the improved policy can be computed by
solving a linear program whose complexity is constant with respect to the game length.
1.1.2 Stochastic Games
A stochastic game is a repeated game where the state can change from stage to stage ac-
cording to a transition that is dependent on the current state and the moves of both players
[11]. Of interest, is the scenario where one of the players has superior information in
the stochastic game and also solely controls the state transitions. This scenario creates a
complication for the informed player. The complication is that she must decide when and
how to use her private information. Note that by using her private information, she also
reveals that information to player II, the uninformed player. In their seminal work, Au-
mann and Maschler studied the special case, repeated games with asymmetric information,
where every state is absorbing. This work provides insights into the issues that an informed
player must address when playing against an opponent that can observe moves and use that
information to better estimate the state of the world.
Although stochastic games with asymmetric information are more general than the re-
peated case, the ideas and formulations that Aumann and Maschler introduce extend to the
stochastic case [9]. The computational challenges of computing an optimal strategy for the
repeated case also extend to the more general stochastic case. We address the complex-
ity issues of stochastic game in a similar manner to that of repeated games. Specifically,
we consider applying approximate dynamic programming methods, which includes model
predictive control, to yield computable suboptimal policies with guarantees
1.2 Cyber-Attack Forecast Modeling
The security community has placed a significant emphasis on developing tools and tech-
niques to address known security issues. Some examples of this emphasis include security
4
tools such as anti-virus software and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). This reactive ap-
proach to security is effective against novice adversaries (e.g. script kiddies) because they
typically use off-the-shelf tools and popular techniques to conduct their attacks [12]. In
contrast, the innovative adversaries often devise novel attack vectors and methodologies
that can render reactive measures inadequate. These pioneering adversaries have contin-
ually pushed the security frontier forward and motivate a need for proactive security ap-
proaches.
A proactive approach that we pursue in Chapter 5 is actionable cyber-attack forecasting.
The objectives of actionable cyber-attack forecasting are to learn an attacker’s behavioral
model, to predict future attacks, and to select appropriate countermeasures [13]. The com-
putational complexity of analyzing attacker models has been an impediment to the realiza-
tion of reliable cyber-attack forecasting. We address this complexity issue by developing
adversary models and corresponding complexity reduction techniques. We then introduce
a heuristic for learning behavioral models of potentially deceptive adversaries online. Last,
we consider a capture-the-flag problem, formulate the problem as a cyber-security game
with asymmetric information, and demonstrate how the models and techniques developed
in this chapter can be used to forecast a cyber-attack and recommend appropriate counter-
measures.
1.3 Outline
This thesis is organized as follows. It is divided into three chapters, where the first two
chapters cover repeated and stochastic games with asymmetric information, and the last
chapter discusses cyber-attack forecast modeling. Each of these chapters is intended to be
self-contained apart from some general mathematical preliminaries reviewed in the next
chapter. Therefore a reader interested in only one of these three areas can pick up the nec-
essary background in the next chapter and then skip to the chapter of interest. Readers
5
that have a solid understanding of asymmetric information games and dynamic program-
ming can proceed directly to the chapter of interest. The last chapter summarizes the key






Game Theory provides methods to model decision problems as games, where each decision
maker can have competing objectives; these methods can enable the interactions among
decision makers to be studied. Although game theory has seen widespread applications in
economics, it has also been used as a tool to study social and behavioral phenomena that
include conflict resolution scenarios. Cyber security is a conflict resolution scenario that
has recently garnered much attention from businesses and governments [14]. Since cyber
security typically includes at least two decision makers (e.g. defender and attacker) with
contradictory objectives who are competing with each other, game theory can provide a
way to model this scenario as a strategic game to predict the likely behaviors/actions of the
defenders and attackers.
A strategic game consists of a set of players {1, . . . , P}, a set of actions Ai for each
player i, and preferences over action profiles characterized by a function ui : A 7→ R
[15], [16], [17]. An example of a conflict resolution scenario modeled as a game is the
well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma. In this scenario, there are two players, a set of actions
Ai = {Cooperate, Defect} for player i, and a utility function represented by the matrix
C D
C 2, 2 0, 3
D 3, 0 1, 1
(1)
Note that player I is the row player and player II is the column player. The best outcome
for player I is if player II cooperates because player I can then achieve a payoff of 3 if she
defects. This scenario (D,C) is an unlikely outcome because each player has a dominant
strategy, which is to defect. Note that a strategy is dominant if there exists no other strategy
that can achieve a better payoff for all choices of the opponent. Since defect is a dominant
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strategy, a rational player will always select this action. Therefore, the likely outcome for
the game is (D,D) with a payoff of 1 for each player. However, the best outcome for both
players collectively is collaborate as (C,C) yields a payoff of 2. The dilemma is then if
each player decides to cooperate in order to achieve the best payoff for the group, he/she
risks the other player defecting and therefore receiving a payoff of 0.
2.1.1 Nash Equilibrium
The action profile a∗ is a pure Nash equilibrium if for every player i
ui(a∗) ≥ ui(ai, a∗−i)
for every ai ∈ Ai, where a−i denotes the collective actions of every decision maker except i
(i.e. a−i = (a1, a2, ai−1, . . . , ai+1, ...aN)). Prisoner’s Dilemma has a pure Nash Equilibrium,
which is the action profile (D,D). Each player in a Nash equilibrium does not have a
unilateral incentive to deviate from their current selected action. However, it need not be
the case that there is a unique Nash equilibrium or that an equilibrium exists at all. The
following game, Matching pennies with payoff matrix
H T
H 1,−1 −1, 1
T −1, 1 1,−1
(2)
is an example of a game that does not have a pure Nash equilibrium.
A more generalized concept of equilibrium in strategic games is a mixed Nash Equi-
librium. In his famous Ph.D. thesis [18], John Nash proved that every game with a finite
number of players in which each player can choose from finitely many pure strategies has
at least one mixed Nash equilibrium. Nash’s work generalized the equilibrium concept of
John Von Neumann. Von Neumann showed that a special class of games, zero-sum games,
had at least one equilibrium [19]. A mixed strategy of a player in a strategic game is a
probability distribution over the player’s actions. Let α denote a mixed strategy profile.
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The mixed strategy profile α∗ is a mixed Nash equilibrium if for every player i
Ui(α∗) ≥ Ui(αi, α∗−i),
where Ui(α) is player i’s expected payoff when all players randomize according to the
mixed strategy profile α. In matching pennies, the mixed Nash Equilibrium is the following.
Each player chooses an action of Heads or Tails with probability 12 . In general, a Nash
equilibrium does not guarantee that the equilibrium strategies the players select are optimal.
However, for zero-sum games, which is a subclass of games that includes matching pennies,
the Nash equilibrium strategy is optimal.
2.1.2 Zero-sum Games
A zero-sum game is defined as a game where the payoff functions u1 and u2 of players I
and II respectively are such that
u1(a1, a2) + u2(a1, a2) = 0
for every pair (a1, a2) of actions. In words, the players’ interests in these games are dia-
metrically opposed as what is the best outcome for one player is the worst outcome for the










where player I’s payoff is represented in equation (4) and player II’s payoff is the inverse.




The celebrated Minimax Theorem that was introduced by Von Neumann proved that every
zero-sum game has a Nash Equilibrium and that the Nash equilibrium strategy is optimal
for the two players. The formal theorem is presented below:
Theorem 1 (Minimax Theorem) [20] For every two-person, zero-sum game, there exists
a mixed strategy for each player, such that the expected payoff for both is the same value
V when the players use these strategies. Furthermore, V is the best guarantee that each
player can expect to receive from a play of the game; that is, these mixed strategies are the
optimal strategies for the two players.
The proof of the minimax theorem provides insights into how to solve zero-sum games
by formulating the game as a linear program. To prove the minimax theorem, it is sufficient
show that the following expressions










are equal in value, where M is the payoff matrix, x is the mixed strategy of the row player
and y is the mixed strategy of the column player. It can be proved that equation (6) is the
dual of equation (5). Therefore, by duality theory, the optimal objectives of the two LPs
are the same.
2.1.2.2 LP formulation








s.t. Mu ≥ 1′
u ≥ 0
(7)





−1, then the value V is equal to β and the optimal mixed strategy x∗ of
player is x∗ = βu∗.
2.1.3 Repeated Games
In a repeated game, a set of players play the same strategic game G over several stages.
Each player can perfectly observe the moves of the other players and also keeps a history
of the moves of the players for each stage of the game. Strategies in these games are
mappings from histories to actions. The key difference between a one-shot game and a
repeated game is that in a repeated game, each player has to take into account the impact
of his/her current action on the future actions of the other players [22]. In other words,
her previous actions can have a direct impact on her reputation and how the other players
respond/retaliate. Repeated games can be divided into two subclasses, finitely and infinitely
repeated games.
2.1.3.1 Finitely Repeated Games
A finitely repeated game is played over N stages. An example repeated game that will be
considered is Prisoner’s Dilemma [23]. To evaluate the Nash equilibrium of this game,
it is useful to consider the last stage N. Observe that the actions of player i at this stage
has no future consequence as the other players cannot punish player i because the game
will have ended. Therefore, each player can view the last stage of the game as a one-
shot game. In a one-shot game, each player will choose to defect, as this is a dominant
strategy. Consider stage N − 1. Both players know that their opponent will defect at
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stage N. Therefore, regardless of what actions are played at stage N − 1, these actions
will not impact the outcome of stage N and conversely the actions will also not lead to any
punishment. Continuing this line of reasoning, it can be concluded that the optimal strategy
for both players at each stage is (D,D) and this is also the Nash Equilibrium.
2.1.3.2 Infinitely Repeated Games





A key feature of infinitely repeated games is that there is no final stage. Therefore, there
is always a threat of future punishment for both players. This is in stark contrast to finitely
repeated games where it was demonstrated in the Prisoner’s Dilemma example that reputa-
tion did not matter as neither player could punish the other in the future. There are several
strategies that can be employed in the infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, and each
strategy relies on the threat of future punishment to influence the other players move at the
current stage [15].
The first strategy to be considered is Grim trigger. This strategy is defined as follows:
si(∅) = C and
si(a1, ...., an) =

C if (a1j , . . . , a
n
j) = (C, . . . ,C)
D otherwise
(8)
for every history (a1, . . . , an), where j is the other player. In words, player i will cooperate
at each stage until player j defects. Once player j defects, player i will defect forever
going forward. The main idea is that any short-term gain that one of players can receive for
defecting at stage m will be negligible if the discount factor δ is sufficiently close to 1. This
is because the other player will defect for all time after and the most the defecting player
can achieve is a payoff of 1. Therefore, if both players select a Grim trigger strategy when
δ is sufficiently close to 1, they each have no unilateral incentive to deviate and thus are in
an equilibrium.
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Tit-for-tat is another strategy that will be considered. The strategy is as follows. Let
n be the first period that player II chooses D. Then player I chooses D in period n+1,
and continues to choose D until player II reverts to C. It can be shown that if each player
uses tit-for-tat when δ is sufficiently close to 1, then tit-for-tat is a Nash equilibrium in the
infinitely repeated game.
2.1.4 Bayesian Games
In many conflict-resolution scenarios, each decision maker can have uncertainty about the
preferences or intentions of the other decision maker. An example of such a scenario is
poker, where each player has some uncertainty about their opponent’s cards. The avail-
able information each player has is their cards and this information can be used to make
probabilistic inferences about the opponent’s cards. Bayesian games are a branch of game
theory that considers scenarios where each decision maker has some uncertainty about the
underlying state of the world [24]. In these games, each decision maker can observe signals
that are correlated to the state and use their observations to update their beliefs about the
underlying state. In the previously mentioned poker example, the state of the world is the
opponent’s card and the signal is the players own cards.
A Bayesian game consists of i) a set of players ii) a set of states iii) a set of signals for
each player iv) a set of actions for each player v) a belief about the state, which are after-
the-fact probabilities on the state given signals observed for each player vi) a Bernoulli
payoff function over pairs (a, ω) , where a is an action profile and ω is a state [25]. Note
the following. vNM preferences are preferences regarding lotteries represented by the ex-
pected value of a payoff function over deterministic outcomes. A Bernoulli payoff function
is a payoff function over deterministic outcomes whose expected value represents vNM
preferences. In the situation where one decision maker is privy to the underlying state,
these games are referred to as asymmetric information games. For illustrative purposes,
consider Battle of the sexes (BoS), a complete information game. Now suppose that the
row player has uncertainty about the game payoffs. This modified BoS game is an example
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of an asymmetric information game. It can be useful to interpret the game as the row player
having uncertainty about the type of column player they face. Example payoff matrices for
the BoS with two types of column player are
B S
B 2, 1 0, 0
S 0, 0 1, 2
State α
B S
B 2, 0 0, 2
S 0, 1 1, 0
State β
(9)
where α and β are the types of the column player.
A Bayes-Nash equilibrium is the Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian game [16]. Note
that a Bayesian game can be formulated as a game with complete information. In the
complete information formulation, each type of column player is modeled as a distinct
player. Therefore, if there are N types of column players in the Bayesian game, there will
be N + 1 distinct players in the complete information game formulation.
2.2 Dynamic Programming
Dynamic programming describes the process of solving multistage decision problems,
where the goal is to find the best decisions in succession that minimize a certain cost
[26], [27], [28]. An important characteristic of these decision problems is that decisions
at each stage cannot be viewed in isolation because of the need to trade off short-term and
long-term costs. The dynamic programming method captures this tradeoff by breaking the
decision problem into smaller subproblems [29]. At each stage, decisions are ranked based
on the sum of the present cost and the expected future cost, assuming optimal decision
making for subsequent stages. Richard Bellman pioneered this idea, which is referred to as
the Principle of Optimality [28].
The systems that will be considered in this dissertation are discrete-time dynamic sys-
tems that have a cost function that is additive over time. Notation in this chapter will be
14
consistent with that of Bertsekas in [26]. This work ([26]) provides more in-depth coverage
of the Dynamic Programing material. The general form of the system is
xk+1 = fk(xk, µk, ωk), k = 0, 1, . . . ,N − 1
where k indexes discrete time, xk is the state of the system, µk is the decision variable to be




gk(xk, µk, ωk), (10)
where gN(xN) is a terminal cost incurred at the end of the process.
2.2.1 Imperfect State Information Problems
In a dynamic system, it often happens that there can exist uncertainty about the exact value
of the current state xk. This uncertainty can be attributed to the inaccessibility of some
state variables, sensor error, or the cost of obtaining the exact value of the state [30]. These
situations are modeled by assuming that the controller receives some observations about the
value of the current state xk at stage k. Problems where observations are used in place of
the state are called imperfect state information problems. It turns out that imperfect state
information problems can be reformulated as a perfect state information problems [26].
Therefore, tools and approaches that are used to solve perfect state information problems
can be also used to solve these problems. An example problem will be presented next to
demonstrate this reformulation.
Consider the following problem where the controller only has access to observations zk
of the form
z0 = h0(x0, v0), zk = hk(xk, µk−1, vk), k = 1, 2, . . . ,N − 1
where vk is the observation disturbance and is characterized by a given probability distri-
bution
Pvk(· | xk, . . . , x0, µk−1, . . . , µ0, ωk−1, . . . , ω0, vk−1, . . . , v0).
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Denote Ik to be the information available to the controller at time k, where
Ik = (z0, z1, . . . , zk, µ0, µ1, . . . , µk−1), k = 1, 2, . . . ,N − 1








where each function µk maps the information vector Ik into the control space Ck and
µk(Ik) ∈ Uk ∀Ik, k = 0, 1, . . . ,N − 1
To reformulate the problem as a perfect information problem, it is necessary to define
a new system whose state at time k is the set of all information Ik that the controller has
available. Note that Ik+1 = (Ik, zk+1, µk). Therefore,
P(zK+1 | Ik, µk) = P(zk+1 | Ik, µk, z0, z1, . . . , zk).
Observe that the probability distribution of zk+1 depends explicitly on the state Ik and control













that leads to the new cost function





The problem has now been reformulated as a perfect information problem.
2.2.2 Approximate Dynamic Programming
Obtaining an optimal policy from the dynamic programing (DP) algorithm can often be
computationally prohibitive. In many instances, as the size of the DP increases, the compu-
tational complexity increases exponentially; this phenomena is called the “curse of dimen-
sionality [28].” In fact, even for a perfect state information problem with Euclidean state
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and control spaces, DP can only be applied numerically if the dimensions of the spaces are
relatively small [26]. Since imperfect state problems are more complex than their perfect
state counterparts, only in special cases can a numerical solution be computed. To ad-
dress the complexity issues that DP presents, methods for computing suboptimal policies
are considered in the ensuing sections. Depending on the problem, some methods can be
more appropriate than others in the since that those methods strike a better balance between
convenient implementation and adequate performance. The methods that will be discussed
in this section are limited lookahead, policy improvement, and model predictive control as
these methods play a significant role in the derivation of the main theoretical results of this
dissertation.
2.2.2.1 Limited Lookahead
Given an N-stage decision problem, the DP algorithm requires computation of optimal
policies for stages k = k′ + 1, k′ + 2, . . . ,N to evaluate the performance of the policies at
stage k = k′. This computation is expensive and becomes increasingly prohibitive as N
grows large. An approach to simplify the computation needed to evaluate the policies at
stage k′ is to truncate the time horizon and use at each stage a decision based on lookahead
of a small number of stages [31]. The simplest approach is to consider looking ahead only
one step into the future.
Let µ̄k(xk) denote the control at stage k and state xk that implements a one-step looka-





gk(xk, uk, ωk + J̃k+1( fk(xk, uk, ωk))
]
(12)
then represents the minimum cost for such a policy where J̃k+1 is an approximation of the
actual cost-to-go function Jk+1. Similarly, one can consider policies that look a fixed m
steps into the future or consider a policy where the lookahead horizon recedes over time.
The following theorem presented in [26] provides conditions under which the one-step
lookahead policy achieves a cost J̄k(xk) that is better than the approximation J̃k(xk).
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gk(xk, uk, ωk) + J̃k+1( fk(xk, uk, ωk))
]
≤ J̃k(xk). (13)
Then the cost-to-go functions J̄k corresponding to a one-step lookahead policy that uses J̃k





gk(xk, uk, ωk) + J̃k+1( fk(xk, uk, ωk))
]
. (14)
It is worth pointing out that incrementing the lookahead steps can increase the perfor-
mance of the policy, but it can also increase the computation substantially. Therefore, a key
design decision is determining how many lookahead steps into the future is best. For a given
J̃k(xk) and a given process, there can be a significant diminishing return on performance as
the lookahead horizon increases. The discussion has been centered around applying this
policy to finite horizon problems, but this policy is equally applicable/relevant to infinite
horizon problems.
2.2.2.2 Policy Improvement (Rollout policies)
Let a suboptimal policy π = {µ0, . . . , µN−1} be referred to as a base policy. Note that the
base policy is typically a policy that is easily implementable. Then the rollout algorithm
can be viewed as a single step of the classical policy iteration method that starts from the
base policy and yields an improved policy called the rollout policy [32]. Alternatively,
one can view the rollout policy as a one-step lookahead policy, with the optimal cost-to-go
approximated by the cost-to-go of the base policy. The policy improvement mechanism of
the underlying policy iteration process generally allows rollout algorithms to magnify the
effectiveness of any given heuristic through sequential application [33].
To speed up the computation of the rollout policy, one can restrict the set of controls
to a subset Û ⊂ U. Also, one can consider an approximation Ĵk+1 of J̃k+1 to simplify









that is more computationally tractable then the original minimization problem. The im-
provement in the speed of computation, however, generally comes at the expense of per-
formance.
2.2.2.3 Model Predictive Control
Model predictive control (MPC), also known as receding horizon control, is a form of
control in which the current action is determined by solving a finite horizon open-loop
optimal control problem online at each sampling instant [34]. MPC combines elements
of several ideas, rollout algorithms and limited lookahead, that have been discussed in the
previous sections. The general process for MPC can be summarized as the following:
1. Obtain estimates of the current state of the system
2. Calculate optimal input minimizing the desired cost function over the prediction hori-
zon using the system model and the current state estate for prediction
3. Implement the first part of the optimal input and discard the remaining parts of the
input
4. Continue with 1.
Note that a key difference between MPC and conventional control is that conventional
control uses a pre-computed control law [35]. A key point to emphasize is that although
an open loop control problem is being solved at each time step k, there is still an implicit
feedback mechanism. This mechanism is the new state xk+1, which embodies all current
and relevant information about system, that is fed back into the control problem to compute
control actions for time step k + 1.
A key objective of MPC is to obtain a stable closed-loop system. However, it can be the
case that the implementation of this control approach drives the closed-loop system outside
the feasible region. Consider the following as an example. Suppose that MPC is used to
compute control actions µk at time k and those actions are applied to the system. Since
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the horizon of the control problem solved at time k is based on a prediction, a disturbance
during time k can make the optimization problem infeasible. As a consequence, the system
will then be unstable if control action µk is applied. Therefore it is important to analyze
under what conditions will the application of MPC make the system unstable. This example
highlights another issue that is the length l of the horizon to consider. Considering a longer
horizon does not necessarily guarantee improved performance. In fact, it can happen that a
shorter horizon improves the system’s performance.
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CHAPTER 3
REPEATED GAMES WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
3.1 Introduction
Repeated incomplete information games are a branch of game theory that considers the sce-
nario where each decision maker has private information about the state of the world and
must decide how to best use that information throughout a period of repeated interactions
with other decision makers. Of interest in this research is the asymmetric case, where only
one decision maker has private information. Since all other information is assumed public,
private information implies superior information in this context. The dilemma faced by the
informed decision maker is how to trade off the short-term reward versus long-term conse-
quences for exploiting her1 private information, since exploitation can reveal the true state
of the world to the other decision makers; in the zero-sum games we consider, revelation
costs her in the long-run. Seminal work by Aumann and Maschler [10] derives a recur-
sive formula for the value of the zero-sum game, which quantifies the exploitation tradeoff,
and also derives the optimal policy for the informed decision maker. Using Aumann and
Maschlers’ model for explicit computations of optimal policies is prohibitive for games
with multiple stages.
3.1.1 Previous Work
Previous work to address complexity issues of computing optimal policies has been mostly
limited to special cases of the simplest zero-sum games. Heur [36] derives optimal polices
for a specific 2 × 2 matrix game with two states. Domansky and Kreps [5] expand on
the work of Heur by considering a subclass of 2 × 2 matrix games with two states, where
Heur’s zero-sum game is contained within that subclass. They show that the games in their
subclass satisfy a special condition, which allows them to derive optimal policies for the
1In this chapter, we will refer to the informed player as “she” and the uninformed player as “he”. The
assignment of “he” and “she” was arbitrary and was done for the purpose of clarity.
21
games. There is work that considers using suboptimal strategies to address the complex-
ity issue for all classes of games [6]. In this work, the informed player never uses his
information throughout the game, and accordingly is “non-revealing.” While the subopti-
mal strategies are readily computable, only under special circumstances do these strategies
offer strong suboptimal payoffs. In contrast to the previously mentioned work, Gilpin and
Sandholm [37] consider computing optimal policies for the infinite horizon games by using
a discritization technique to approximately solve a non-convex optimization problem.
3.1.2 Contributions of the Work
We address the complexity issues for both finite horizon and infinite horizon zero-sum re-
peated games by deriving a suboptimal policy based on the concept of policy improvement.
Policy improvement is a dynamic programming technique that first considers an initial pol-
icy, referred to as a baseline policy, that is easily implementable. Through an iterative
process, the performance of the baseline policy is compared to that of other policies from a
set of candidate policies. If a candidate policy performs better, it becomes the new baseline
policy. The baseline policy we consider is a non-revealing policy, i.e., one that completes
ignores superior information. The improved policy, which is implemented in a receding
horizon manner, strategizes for the current stage while assuming a non-revealing policy for
future stages. We derive bounds on the guaranteed performance of the improved policy and
establish that the bounds are tight. We show that the performance of the policy improveme-
ment methods converge asymptotically to optimal with respect to the number of stages in
the game. As a result of the convergence result, policy improvement is optimal for infinitely
repeated zero-sum games. Last, we show that the improved policy can be computed by
solving a linear program whose complexity is constant with respect to the game length.
3.1.3 Outline
The outline for the rest of this chapter is as follows. In Section 3.2, we discuss fundamental
zero-sum game definitions and concepts. This discussion will include both the repeated and
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stochastic zero-sum games. Next, in Section 3.3, we present Aumann and Maschler’s dy-
namic programming formulation for deriving optimal policies in zero-sum repeated games,
and discuss the complexity issues of this formualtion. In Section 3.4, we discuss previous
work on addressing the complexity issues of computing optimal policies. We then present
the main results of this chapter in Sections 3.5 and 3.6. In Section 3.5, we introduce policy
improvement methods to compute suboptimal strategies and derive bounds on the perfor-
mance of the methods. In Section 3.6, we show how the policy improvement methods
can be computed by solving a LP whose complexity is invariant with respect to the game
length. Simulations that demonstrate the performance of the policy improvement methods
are presented in Section 5.8. Last, we conclude with a brief summary of the chapter.
3.2 Preliminaries on Zero-sum Games with Asymmetric Information
Optimal information exploitation is a key issue in zero-sum games with asymmetric infor-
mation. In these games, player I is informed about the current state of the world at each
stage, while player II is not. The simplest case, repeated games, is where the state of world
is chosen by nature before the initial stage of the game and remains fixed over all stages.
An illustration of a two state repeated game is depicted in Figure 1a. The general case,
stochastic games, is where the state of the world can change at each stage. An illustration
of a two state stochastic game where the state transitions are independent of the player’s
actions is depicted in Figure 1b. In either case, each player’s knowledge about the other’s
past actions changes over time, affects their beliefs, and introduces a dynamic aspect to the
games. Specifically, player II can use his observations of player I’s past actions to build
beliefs about the current state of the world. Therefore, player I must strategically select an
appropriate action at each stage that transmits the desired information or misinformation
to player II. In this section, we will present models, definitions, and concepts for both re-
peated and stochastic games. We will also present examples that illustrate the information
exploitation issues that player I experiences.
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(a) Repeated Game (b) Stochastic Game
Figure 1: Repeated games are a special case of stochastic games where all states are said to be
absorbing.
3.2.1 Repeated Games
Two players repeatedly play a zero-sum matrix game over stages m = 1, 2, ...,N. The row
player is the maximizer, and the column player is the minimizer. The specific game is
selected from a finite set of possible games (or states of the world), K. Let ∆(B) denote the
set of probability distributions over some finite set, B. Define S to be the set of pure actions
of the row player and similarly define T to be the set of pure actions of the column player.
The game matrix at state k ∈ K is denoted Mk ∈ R|S |×|T |. Before the initial stage m = 1,
nature selects the specific game according to a probability distribution p ∈ ∆(K), which
is common knowledge. The outcome of this selection is not revealed to the uninformed
player. Once selected, the game remains fixed over all stages. The n-stage game is denoted
as Γn(p). Similarly, the discounted and infinitely repeated games are denoted as Γλ(p) and
Γ∞(p) respectively.
3.2.1.1 Strategies
For n = 1, 2, . . . , let Hn=[S × T ]n−1 be the set of possible histories at stage n. Then hn ∈ Hn
is a sequence (s1, t1; s2, t2; . . . ; sn−1, tn−1) of moves of the two players in the first n−1 stages
of the game. Let X = ∆(S ) and Y = ∆(T ) denote the mixed moves of player I and player
II respectively where xkn = (x
k
n(s))s∈S . Let ζn : k × hn 7→ S denote a pure strategy for
player I and define ζ = (ζ1, ζ2, . . . , ζn). Similarly let ψn : hn 7→ T denote a pure strategy
of player II and define ψ = (ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψn). Mixed strategies are probability distributions
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over pure strategies. Behavior strategies are sequences of mappings from K × Hn to X and
mappings from Hn to Y for player I and player II respectively. Aumann [8] showed that
mixed strategies can be equivalently represented as behavior strategies for the zero-sum
games considered in this paper. Therefore, the terms behavior strategy and mixed strategy
will be used interchangeably. Let σ and τ denote the behavior strategies of players I and
II respectively. Also let σ(hn) = (xkn)k∈K ∈ X be defined as the vector of mixed moves of
player I at stage n.
3.2.1.2 Payoffs
Let Mki, j denote element (i, j) of payoff matrix M
k and also denote gm = Mkim, jm to be the




p,σ,τ denote the expected payoff for the pair
of behavioral strategies (σ, τ) at stage m. The payoff for the n-stage game is then defined
as












λ(1 − λ)m−1γpm(σ, τ). (17)
Definition 1 Player I can guarantee φ ∈ R in the game Γn(p) if, for every ε > 0 there exists
a strategy σ of player I and N ∈ N such that
∀τ,∀n ≥ N, γ̄pn (σ, τ) ≥ φ − ε
Definition 2 Player II can defend φ ∈ R in the game Γn(p) if, for every ε > 0 and every
strategy σ of player 1, there exists a strategy τ of player II and N ∈ N such that
∀n ≥ N, γ̄pn (σ, τ) ≤ φ + ε.
3.2.1.3 Beliefs
Since player II is not informed of the selected state k, he can build beliefs on which state
was selected. These beliefs are a function of the initial distribution p and his observed
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moves of player I. Therefore, player I must carefully consider her actions at each stage as
they could potentially reveal the true state of the world to player II. In order to get a worse
case estimate of how much information player I transmits through her moves, she models
player II as a Bayesian player and assumes that player II knows her behavior strategy. The
updated belief p+ is computed as








Revealing information is defined as using a different mixed strategy in each state k at stage
m. From (69), it follows that a mixed strategy xm at stage m does not change the current
beliefs of the row player if xkm = x
k′
m ∀ k, k
′. As a consequence, not revealing information
is equivalent to not changing the column player’s beliefs about the true state of the world.
In stochastic games, it is possible for the column player’s beliefs to change even if the row
player uses an identical mixed strategy for each state k.







where the set of non-revealing strategies is defined as NR = {xm | xkm = x
k′
m ∀k, k
′ ∈ K}. By
playing an optimal non-revealing strategy at each stage of the game, the row player can
guarantee a game payoff of u(p). Note that the optimal game payoff for the n-stage game,
vn(p), is equal to u(p) only under special conditions.
Definition 3 Let Cav[u(p)] be the point-wise smallest concave function g on ∆(K) satisfy-
ing g(p) ≥ u(p) ∀p ∈ ∆(K).




As discussed in Section 3.2.1.3, player II can build beliefs about the state of the world based
on his observations of player I. Since each player’s actions are observable by the other
player, player I can use her actions in such a manner to influence player II’s beliefs about
the true state of the world. Player I can also influence her opponent’s beliefs by introducing
auxiliary signals into the game to communicate additional information or misinformation
about the true state. These signal can be correlated with the state of the world and are
announced by player I and observed by player II.
Let L be the set of auxiliary signals and let l be a signal contained within the set.
Denote µk(l) to be the probability that player I selects signal l in state k. The following
lemma provides a method that allows player I to construct a specific µ to change the beliefs
of player II in a desired direction. Note that the auxiliary signal is also a signal to player I
and influences her move selection.
Lemma 3.2.1 [7] Let L be a finite set and p =
∑
l∈L αl pl with α ∈ ∆(L) , and p,pl ∈ ∆(K)
for all l in L. Then there exists a µ that changes the beliefs of player II from (K, p) to L
between the transition from the current stage and the next stage such that
P(l) = αl and P(·|l) = pl


















In this section, we will consider three examples that illustrate the ways player I can exploit
her information. In the first example, there are two states of the world and each state is
equally likely to be selected. Player I is told before the start of the game whether the state










She has a choice of selecting move T or move B in each state. However, she favors selecting
T in state α and B in state β because this is a dominant strategy. A standard approach to
evaluate the performance of a given strategy is to assume player II is told the strategy.
Suppose player I plays her dominant strategy. Upon seeing T, player II will immediately
know the state is α. Similarly, upon seeing B, he will know the state is β. This is why the
dominant strategy is said to be completely revealing in this example. After stage 1, player
II will play R if state α and L in state β, which will net player I an expected stage payoff
of 0 from stage 2 onward. The payoff for player I with respect to n would be 12n and so the
immediate gain for exploiting information diminishes for games with large n.
Another possible strategy that player I can consider is a non-revealing strategy. In this
strategy, player I plays as if she is oblivious of the state of the world. This situation is





where M̄ = pαMα + pβMβ. A solution to the average game can be computed by solving
u(p). If player I plays T and B with equal probability independent of the state, she can
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guarantee a payoff of 14 . Therefore player I is better off not using her information in the
long-run.
The second example has the same parameters as the previous example, except for the










If player I uses her dominant strategy, she will guarantee an expected payoff of 0. This
dominant strategy, which is to play B in state α and T in state β, is completely revealing
and optimal for all n. This is because the best payoff player I can achieve is 0 in either





and the expected payoff for the average game is −14 . Whereas not using information was
the best long-term decision for player I in the first example, in this example exploiting
information is optimal for the short and long term.
The last example we will consider has payoff matrices
L M R
T 4 0 2
B 4 0 −2
State α
L M R
T 0 4 −2
B 0 4 2
State β
Similarly to the previous examples, the other parameters of the game are the same as in the
previous examples. Also similar to previous examples is that playing a dominant strategy
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is completely revealing and achieves a payoff of 0 in the long-run. If player I decides to
not use her information, she will be playing the non-revealing game
L M R
T 0 4 −2
B 0 4 2
that also achieves a long-term payoff of 0. In all of the examples that we have presented so
far, we have only considered completely revealing and non-revealing strategies. There is
another strategy that player I can consider, which is a partially revealing strategy. The main
idea of partially revealing strategies is that this strategy is partially correlated with the true
state of the world. Instead of player I playing T in state α with probability 1 and B in state
β with probability 1, she does the following. If the state is α play T with probability 34 at
stage 1. If the state is β, play B with probability 34 at stage 1. Player I’s mixed actions at
stage m = 1 are then x̃11 = [.75, .25] and x̃
2
1 = [.25, .75]. From stage 2 onward, she will then
play nonrevealing.
To evaluate the performance of this strategy, we will assume player II knows it. In the
first stage player I can guarantee an expected stage payoff of 1 by playing x̃. Suppose that
T is selected by player I at the first stage, then the beliefs of player II will be
pT = [.75, .25] = p+(p, x̃,T ),
where his beliefs about state α are 34 . Similary players II’s beliefs upon seeing B are
pB = [.25, .75] = p+(p, x̃, B).
By playing non-revealing from stage 2 going forward, players I’s long-term payoff will
either be u(pT ) or u(pB). In this example
u(pT ) = u(pT ) = 1.
Therefore player I can guarantee an expected game payoff of at least 1, independent of what
player II does. The idea of using signals, which in this example are players I’s actions, to
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change the beliefs of player II is the heart of asymmetric information games. This is also
an idea we will exploit in the policy improvement methods we present later in the paper.
3.2.2 Remarks
The primary focus of this chapter is to address the challenges that an informed player faces
with regard to information exploitation and computation of optimal policies. An interesting
aspect of incomplete information games that we do not address is the challenges that an
uninformed player faces learning the actual state of the world. We will devote this section
to discussing these issues for repeated games. Player II experiences similar issues in the
stochastic games also. We will also present a heuristic for computing a suboptimal strategy
that is inspired by a central idea used to construct optimal policies for player II in the finite
and infinite horizon games. This idea involves considering the actual payouts that player I
would receive for each state of the world. Since player II can observe the moves of player I,
he can construct a vector of payoffs, where the kth element corresponds to player I’s payoff
if the state was k. Player II’s strategy is then to ensure that the payoff vector remains within










These results, however do not extend to the general n-stage game. In [6], a method to
enforce vector payoffs is discussed that guarantees an optimal payoff to player I for the
infinitely repeated games. This method incorporates Blackwell’s approachability theorem
to enforce payoffs and guarantee an expected payout of Cav[u(p)])
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3.2.2.1 Challenges of learning the true state
Learning the true state of the world is challenging for player II because player I can play in
a deceptive manner [36]. If player II new the mixed actions xk that player I would use for
each state k, then learning player I’s type would be straightforward because the defender
could follow the standard Bayesian update approach. Unfortunately, in the actual play of
the game, he does not know her mixed strategy as this information is private. Another ap-
proach that the he can consider is solving a linear program to compute an optimal defensive
strategy. However, the complexity of the LP is exponential with respect to n, the number of
stages of the game. We will now introduce a payoff-based heuristic for learning player I’s
type that is computationally tractable for arbitrary n and only depends on the information
that the defender has. This information is namely the history of player I’s actions.
3.2.2.2 Heuristic
The main idea behind the payoff-based heuristic is as follows. Player II’s belief of a player
I of type k will be correlated with the actual game payoff of player I. After each stage,
player II keeps track of what the overall game payoff would be for each type of player I.
The game payoff for a player I of type k at stage n, given history hn will be denoted γ̃kn(hn).
The game payoff γ̃kn(hn) for a player I of type k will be compared to the best possible payoff









be a measure of the likelihood that an attacker is of type k given history hn. The belief










k(hn). To compute a best response strategy ỹ∗ for player II given the
2Without loss of generality, we will assume in this section that each matrix Mk is scaled with values
ranging from 0 to 1.
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approximate belief p̃n at stage m, solve the optimization equation









The goal of the heuristic is to allow player II to estimate the probability that player I is of
a particular type by using only the information available during the play of the game. This
information is namely the history of moves and the payoff matrices. Recall that in order
for player II to perform Bayesian inference, player II needs to know the mixed strategy of
player I. In the actual play of the game, player II does not have access to this information.
By doing an analysis of the payoffs of each type of player I given the current history, player
II can observe which types currently have the best average payoffs up to the current stage.
The underlying assumption behind the heuristic is that the types that are achieving the best
possible payoff given their type are more likely to be the opponent player II is facing in the
game. Once player II computes an estimate of player I’s type using the heuristic, player II
can then play a best response given current beliefs.
3.3 Dynamic Programing Formulation for Optimal Policies
3.3.1 Finite Horizon Games





















that characterizes the value of n-stage zero-sum repeated games with asymmetric informa-
tion. This formulation can also be interpreted as modeling player I’s tradeoff between the
short-term gain and the long-term informational advantage. Consider the case where n = 1









Since this is a one-shot game, there are no future consequences for exploiting information
at the first stage. Therefore playing greedy is optimal. In games where n ≥ 2, vn(p) is a
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Bellman’s equation with a stage cost of
∑
k∈K pkxk1M









The cost-to-go function characterizes how information that is exploited by player I at the
current stage will cost him in the future. It is the cost-to-go function that makes explicit
computation of vn(p) prohibitive. This is because this function is recursive, and as a con-
sequence, the number decision variables grows exponentially with respect to game length.
One of the goals of this research is to present policy improvement methods to compute
suboptimal polices that have a computational complexity that is invariant with respect to
the length of the game.
Aumann and Maschlers formulation has the following bound
vn(p) ≥ Cav[u(p)].
As a a result, player I can guarante a payoff of Cav[u(p)] for the n-stage game. Another
result of Aumann and Maschler is the rate that the n-stage game converges to Cav[u(p)].
Specifically, the convergence of vn(p) to Cav[u(p)] is








where C = max
i, j,k
Mki, j.
3.3.2 Infinite Horizon Games


















A relationship between the infinitely repeated games v∞(p) and vλ(p) is the following.
Lemma 3.3.1 [6] v∞(p) and vλ(p) converge uniformly (as n→ ∞ and λ→ 0, respectively)
to the same limit, Cav[u(p)], which can be defended by player II in the infinitely repeated
game.
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Also similar to the n stage game, the bound on the rate that vλ converges to Cav[u(p)] is









3.4.1 Finite Horizon Repeated Games










and showed how to explicitly compute optimal strategies for both players in this game. Do-
mansky and Kreps [5] considered two-state zero-sum games with matrices Mα and Mβ that
represents payoffs for states α and β respectively. Domansky and Kreps provide optimal
strategies for games where the condition
val[pM1 + (1 − p)M2] = pval[M1] + (1 − p)val[M2] (31)
holds. Note that val[M] denotes the value of a zero sum matrix game M. They show that


















B 0 (1 − a)
State β
(33)
It happens that (30) is an example of a saddle-point type game. Although Domansky and
Kreps expands upon the work of Heur by generalizing optimal-policy computation results
for a subclass of 2 × 2 matrix games, this subclass comprises only a small portion of the
general class of 2 × 2 matrix games.
Zamir [38] considers classifying games in terms of the rate at which the games con-
verges from v1 to v∞ and then constructing essentially-optimal policies whose payoff also









has a convergence rate of O( log(n)n ). Knowing the convergence rate of this game suggests a
method to derive an essentially optimal policy. Zamir notes, however, that determining the
convergence rate for an arbitrary game is an open question. Therefore, deriving essentially
optimal methods is challenging in general.
3.4.2 Infinite Horizon Repeated Games
Gilpin and Sandholm [37] consider infinitely-repeated zero-sum games with asymmetric










αl pl = p (34)
where
pl ∈ ∆(K) for l ∈ L and α ∈ ∆(L)
for computing Cav[u(p)]. Gilpin et. al then apply basic convex analsysis results to show
that it is sufficient to set |L| = K + 1 to compute Cav[u(p)]. Next they approximately solve
(34) by using discretization methods. Last, they show how optimal strategies for player I
for the infinitely repeated games can be derived from the solved optimization problem (34).
Specifically, let α∗ and p∗l ∈ ∆(K) be solutions to (34), then player I’s optimal strategy is to





pk and play the optimal mixed actions for u(pl).
3.4.3 Receding Horizon Control
In this section we will briefly summarize the main idea of receding horizon optimization
and then proceed to discuss applications of this optimization technique in game settings.
We will begin by considering the following Bellman’s equation
J(x0) = max
a0∈Γ(x0)
{g(x0, a0) + βJ(T (x0, a0))}
where x0 denotes the initial state of the system, J denotes the system’s performance, a0 is
the control input for state x0, and T is the transition function that maps the current input
and state to the next state. Observe that if the cost-to-go function is difficult to compute,
then computing the optimal cost can be prohibitive. In situations where the optimal cost J
is difficult to compute, an approximate Bellman’s equation of the form
J̄(x0) = max
a0∈Γ(x0)
{g(x0, a0) + βJ̃(T (x0, a0))} (35)
can be considered, where J̃ is an approximate cost-to-go function that can be readily com-
puted.
Given the above setup, receding horizon optimization can be leveraged to derive sub-
optimal controls for the system at each state. The process of receding horizon optimization
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can be summarized as follows. First, obtain the estimate of the current state x of the system.
Next, calculate the optimal input maximizing the desired objective function. Then, imple-
ment the first part of the input a and discard the remain parts of the input. Next, continue
with the first step.
Receding Horizon optimization has been applied to various game settings. Cruz et. al.
[39] studied a military operation game with one and two step receding horizon. Van den
Broek [40] considered applying a receding horizon approach for non zero-sum differential
games. Chang and Markus [41] consider a receding horizon approach for two-person zero-
sum Markov Games. In their work, the minimizing player selects a “small” horizon and
solves the game with the finite horizon (called the subgame) under the assumption that the
maximizer makes her decision based on her best performance of the subgame.
3.5 Policy Improvement Methods
Policy improvement is a dynamic programing approach that consists of first considering
an initial policy whose performance is known or can be readily computed. We will select
a non-revealing policy, i.e. one that ignores superior information, as our initial policy in
this section and will refer to this policy as the baseline policy. Next, a candidate policy is
selected from some policy set. If the current candidate policy performs better than the base-
line policy, the candidate policy becomes the new baseline policy. This new baseline policy
is an improvement over the previous baseline policy, and therefore a policy improvement.
This process can then repeated in an iterative manner.
The policy improvement methods presented in this section are based on the ideas of re-
ceding horizon optimization. In the n-stage game, player I solves an optimization problem
over the interval [m, n], where m is the current stage and n is the total number of stages.
We assume that in the future stages, she will only consider non-revealing strategies. This
assumption is key to reducing the complexity of the original dynamic programing formu-
lation vn(p) because of the following idea. By playing non-revealing in all future stages,
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player II’s beliefs p̃m+1, p̃m+2, . . . , p̃n at stages m + 1,m + 2, . . . , n respectively, remain
constant. As a consequence, her expected future payout over the interval [m + 1, n] can be
computed exactly by solving the optimization problem u( p̃). Similarly in infinite horizon
games, the expected stage payout for all future stages is u(p̃), assuming player I plays non-
revealing over all stages in the future. Note that u(p̃) can itself be computed by solving a
linear program whose complexity is invariant with respect to n.
3.5.1 Finite Horizon
3.5.1.1 One-time policy improvement
In one-time policy improvement, player I strategizes for the first stage of the game while
assuming that she will play in a non-revealing manner in all future stages. A dynamic




















p̃+(p, µ, x, s, l)
)]
where x̄µ(s, l) =
∑
k∈K pkxk(s)uk(l) and the kth component of p̃+ is
pkµk(l)xk(s)∑
k∈K pkxk(s)µk(l)
for the n-stage game. We will show that ṽn(p) guarantees a payoff to player I of Cav[u(p)].
Theorem 3 One-time policy improvement guarantees a payoff of at least Cav[u(p)] for the
n-stage repeated game.
Proof: First note that Cav[u(p)] can be expressed as
∑
l∈L αlu(pl), where α ∈ ∆(L) ,
|L| < ∞, p, pl ∈ ∆(K), and p =
∑
l∈L αl pl. Also note that Cav[u(p)] can be computed by













l∈L αl pl = p is nonlinear and nonconvex. In this proof, we will
show an equivalent representation of this problem that allows us to relax the nonlinear
constraint. This relaxation is critical for a key result of this chapter, which is a linear
programing formulation to compute policy-improvement strategies. Observe that Equation


















αl pl = p (37)






























k(l). Observe that the constraint
∑
l∈L
pkµk(l) = pk ∀ k





















p̃+(p, µ, x, s, l)
)]
s.t. xk = xk
′
∀k, k′ (39)
by algebraic manipulation. Observe that the constraints are linear in this formulation of
the optimization problem. Last note that the optimal value of ṽn(p) is at least that of (39)
because the feasible set of (39) is a subset of ṽn(p).
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A game theoretic interpretation of the previous result for the case where constraint
xk = xk
′
∀k, k′ is enforced, as in (38), is the following. In a one-time policy-improvement
strategy, the mixed strategy that player I plays, is a function of the state k, which she is
informed of prior to the first stage of the game. To learn the state k, player II can use her
observation of actions and auxiliary signals to build beliefs since the actions and signals
are correlated with the true state. When the constraint xk = xk
′
∀k, k′ is enforced, player I’s
mixed actions do not transmit any information about the current state,but the signals can
transmit information. Therefore it is sufficient for player II to consider only the signals as a
means to infer the actual state of the world. With one-time policy improvement, at the first
stage, player I decides on the signal probabilities µk(l) for each state k. She then randomly
selects a signal based on µk(l) and then plays an optimal strategy of u(pl), denoted x∗l , for
all stages. From the perspective of player II, by Lemma 3.2.1, the best case is that he can
observe signal l. His beliefs upon observation of l become pl and the game that is being
played at stage 1 is then u(pl). Since this is the only signal emitted in this game, then the
game payoff for seeing l is then u(pl). Since the overall likelihood of player I selecting l
based on the mixture uk(l) is αl,where αl = ū(l), then player I can guarantee an overall game
payoff of
∑
l∈L αlu(pl). It then follows that if player I uses µ∗, she can guarantee Cav[u(p)].






the constraint allows for a richer set of strategies for player I to be considered (i.e., a strategy
where beliefs are dependent on signals and moves).
3.5.1.2 Perpetual policy improvement
Similar to one-time policy improvement, in the perpetual policy improvement method,
player I strategizes for the first stage while assuming a non-revealing strategy in all future
stages. In contrast, once player I arrives at the next stage m′ = m + 1, she can reevaluate
her decision to continue playing the game u(pls) based on the signal l and the action s she
observed in the previous stage. She does this by setting p = pls and implementing the
one-time policy improvement strategy at stage m′.
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Corollary 1 Perpetual policy improvement guarantees a payoff of at least Cav[u(p)] for
the n-stage repeated game.
Proof: We will prove by construction. First, consider stage m = 1 and implement a
one-time policy-improvement strategy. By Theorem 3, there exists a mixed action x∗ and
a mixed signal µ∗ that guarantees a stage payoff of at least Cav[u(p)] and a future payoff







stage m = 2. Suppose signal l and move s were observed in stage 1, then the belief are
pls at stage 2 and the payoff for playing a non-revealing strategy is u(pls). If player I plays
non-revealing over the next n − 1 stages, she can guarantee an expected payoff of u(pls).
Suppose however that player I implements a one-time policy-improvement strategy at stage
m = 2. Note a key observation, which is that








Therefore, the worst that can happen to player I if she decides to implement a one-time
policy improvement at stage m = 2 is that she gets the same payoff u(p∗ls) she would have
received if she hadn’t deviated from the original policy decided at stage m = 1. Consider
stage m. By a similar argument, perpetual policy improvement up to stage m guarantees an
expected payoff of at least Cav[u(p)].
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Algorithm 1 Perpetual policy improvement
1: procedure PERPPOLICYIMPROVE
2: initialize: set p1 = p
3: for m = 1→ N do
4: compute x̂m by solving one-time policy improvement LP with pm
5: select a move s for attacker type k using mixed strategy x̂km



























p̃+(p, µ, x, s, l)
))]
(40)
Theorem 4 One-time policy improvement guarantees a payoff of at least Cav[u(p)] for
λ-discounted infinite-horizon repeated games.
Proof: We will prove by construction the existence of a one-time policy improvement
strategy that guarantees Cav[u(p)]. First note that by applying a basic infinite geometric


















p̃+(p, µ, x, s, l)
)]
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p̃+(p, µ, x, s, l)
)
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p̃+(p, µ, x, s, l)
)
.
Second, fix λ ∈ (0, 1) arbitrarily, and consider a n′ such that λ > 1n′ . Set λ̂ =
1
n′ . Invoking
Theorem 6 yields ṽn′ ≥ Cav[u(p)]. Third, denote x∗ as the optimal stage m = 1 mixed








p̃+(p, µ, x, s, l)
)
≤ Cav[u(p)],













































p̃+(p, µ, x, s, l)
)]
≥ Cav[u(p)].
Therefore, by considering mixed action x∗ and mixed signal µ∗ at stage m = 1 and playing
non-revealing going forward, player I can guarantee a payoff of Cav[u(p)] by playing an
optimal one-time policy improvement strategy ṽλ(p).
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Corollary 2 Perpetual policy improvement guarantees a payoff of at least Cav[u(p)] for
the λ-discounted infinite horizon game.
Proof: By a similar argument used in Corollary 1, we can show that an optimal perpetual-
policy improvement strategy guarantees Cav[u(p)].
3.5.2.2 Infinitely repeated games
Theorem 5 One-time policy improvement is optimal for infinitely repeated games with
asymmetric information.
Proof: We will prove optimality by considering the performance of one-time policy im-
provement strategies as n grows large. Specifically, we will show that the performance of











p̃+(p, µ, x, s, l)
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(42)









αl pl = p
by algebraic manipulation. Since the optimal value of (43) is Cav[u(p)], which is also the
optimal value of the infinitely repeated games, this concludes the proof.
3.6 LP Formulation
3.6.1 LP Formulation of Incomplete Information Games
Ponssard and Sorin [42] consider the general case of incomplete information games where
both players have private information. They showed that finite zero-sum games with incom-
plete information can be formulated as a linear program (LP) to compute optimal strategies.
Let K and R be finite sets. Similar to the asymmetric case, nature chooses k ∈ K according
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to p ∈ ∆(K). Since player II also has private information, nature also chooses r ∈ R ac-
cording to q ∈ ∆(R). Player I and player II can consider pure Bayesian strategies ζ and ψ
respectively. Let ζ(i) be a specific behavior strategy for player I where i ∈ I. Similarly let
ψ( j) be a specific behavior strategy for player II. In this section we will denote x(i) to be the
probability that pure behavior strategy η(i) is selected. Similarly, we will denote y( j) to be
the probability strategy ψ j is selected. Let M̃(ζ, ψ) denote the game payoff to the players
for playing the strategy pair (ζ, ψ). The value of the game is V(p,q) and can be computed






s.t. M̃u ≥ 1′
u ≥ 0
(44)





−1, then V(p, q) = β and x∗ = βu∗. Observe that the number of





and for player II




For the asymmetric case, the following lemmas will be used to derive the minimal number
of pure strategies necessary for each player to compute optimal policies.
Lemma 3.6.1 [7] Player I has an optimal strategy in the n-stage and λ-discounted game
that depends only, at each m, on m and his beliefs pm at stage m. In particular, her strategy
is independent of the moves of player II.
Lemma 3.6.2 [7] Player II has an optimal strategy in the n-stage game and λ-discounted
game that depends only, at each m, on m and (s1, s2, . . . , sm−1). In particular, his strategy is
independent of his own moves.
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Therefore, by the previous lemmas, we have the following. The minimum number of











3.6.2 LP Formulation of Policy Improvement
Theorem 6 A one-time policy-improvement strategy that guarantees Cav[u(p)]) can be
computed by solving a linear programing problem, and the computational complexity of
the linear program is constant with respect to the number of stages of the game.
Proof: We established in Theorem 3 the existence of a behavior strategy σ̃∗ that guaran-
tees a payoff to player I of Cav[u(p)]), where σ̃1 : k 7→ ∆(L) × ∆(X), σ̃m≥2 : h̃1 7→ ∆(X),
and h̃1 is the history at stage m = 1 that include the observed signal and actions. Note
that we assume the worst case at stage 1, with respect to signal l, which is that player II
can also observe signal l and his strategy at stage m = 1 can be dependent on the sig-
nal. Recall that if player I uses behavior strategy σ̃∗, the best player II can do is also
use a strategy τ̃∗ that has the form τ̃1 : l 7→ ∆(Y) and τ̃m≥2 : h̃1 7→ ∆(Y). Observe that
γ
p
m(σ̃∗, τ̃∗) ≥ Cav[u(p)]) ∀m ≥ 1 and σ̃∗m = σ̃
∗
m′ ∀m,m





∗, τ̃∗) = (λ)γp1 (σ̃
∗, τ̃∗) + (1 − λ)γp2 (σ̃
∗, τ̃∗),
where λ = 1n . It is sufficient then to solve for the weighted two-stage game, where λ =
1
n ,
to compute a strategy for the n-stage game that guarantees Cav[u(p)]. For the optimal
strategy at stage m ≥ 3, let σ̃∗m = σ̃
∗
2. Since this game has perfect recall (e.g. Past histories
are perfectly remembered by each player), we can use Aumann’s result on the equivalence
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of behavior and mixed strategies. Specifically, the behavior strategy σ̃∗ of player I can be
equivalently represented as probabilities on pure strategies ζ̃ where ζ̃1 : k 7→ l × s, and
ζ̃m ≥ 2 : h̃1 7→ s are pure strategies for player I at stage 1 and stage m ≥ 2 respectively.




i, ψ̃ j) for strategy pair (ζ̃ i, ψ̃ j), we can solve for the zero-sum game M̃ using linear
programming methods and derive a behavior strategy σ̃∗ that guarantees player I Cav[u(p)].
Equally important is that the size of the strategy sets for both players are independent of the
stages n of the game. Therefore M̃ is invariant with respect to n and so is the computational
complexity of the linear program.
Corollary 3 An optimal strategy for the infinitely repeated game can be computed by solv-
ing a LP, and the computational complexity of the LP remains constant with respect to the
number of stages of the game.
Proof: Construct a matrix M̃ as in Theorem 6 with λ = 1. After solving M̃ using LP
methods, an optimal behavior strategy σ̃ can then be derived that guarantees an optimal
payoff of Cav[u(p)] for infinitely repeated games.
3.6.3 Perpetual Policy Improvement
Perpetual policy improvement consists of repeatedly implementing the one-time policy im-
provement method at every stage of the game. Note that this process is essentially receding
horizon optimization. In this section, we will prove that the repeated application of one-
time policy improvement also guarantees a payoff of at least Cav[u(p)]) in the following
theorem.
Theorem 7 A perpetual policy-improvement strategy that guarantees Cav[u(p)]) can be
computed by solving a linear programing problem online at each stage m, and the compu-
tational complexity of the linear program is constant with respect to the number of stages
of the game.
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Proof: Construct a matrix M̃ as in Theorem 6. For the n-stage game, set λ = 1n . For the
infinitely repeated game, set λ ≈ 1. Solve the zero sum game M̃ and let the optimal prob-
ability distribution of pure strategies ζ be equivalently represented as an optimal behavior
strategy σ̃. Let x∗ and µ∗ denote the optimal mixed action and mixed signal respectively
derived from σ̃ for stage m = 1. Consider the signal l and action s realized at stage m = 1
and let
pm=2 = p̃+(x∗, µ∗, s, l).
To compute the beliefs at stage m = 2, consider the n−1 stage game with initial probability
pm=2. Follow the same process as outlined at stage m = 1. Repeat this process for stage m.
3.7 Simulation
3.7.1 Game Setup
As usual, this game consists of two players. We will denote player I as the defender and
player II as the attacker. The defender is the row player and maximizer and the attacker is
the column player and minimizer. In this example, we assume that the defender knows the
type of security system she is defending, and their are two types of security systems (i.e.
type I and type II). The probability distribution of the type of security system the defender
is defending is uniform (i.e. pk = 12 for k = 1, 2), and there are two stages in this game.










The defender has the option of choosing a defensive configuration that is the best con-
figuration for the security system she is defending. The defensive configurations will be
denoted as DCI and DCII . Note that the defender has the option of behaving deceptively
49
by selecting a defensive configuration that is best suited for a different security system. An
attacker’s actions are to select an attack that is optimized for each possible security system.
His actions for this game are BRI and BRII .
3.7.2 Discussion
We will discuss the performance of four defensive strategies in this section. These strategies
are dominant strategy, non-revealing strategy, one-time policy improvement, and perpetual
policy improvement. In the one-shot game, the optimal strategy for an defender is to choose
the defensive configuration that corresponds to the security system type she is defending.
However, for games where n > 1, this can be a suboptimal strategy because it can reveal the
type of security system to the defender and cost the defender the informational advantage.
Specifically, in the two stage game, the defender can achieve a better payoff by selecting the
perpetual policy improvement strategy. For games where N is large, the dominant strategy
has the worst performance out of the four strategies and the policy improvement strategies
have the best performance.
3.7.2.1 Two-stage game
An optimal non-revealing strategy requires the defender, regardless of the type of security,
to play as if the system is of type I with probability .70 and to play as if the system is type
II with probability .30 at each stage. A graph of the optimal payoff for a non-revealing
strategy with respect to p can be seen in Figure 2. This strategy rewards the defender
with a payoff of 18 and has the worst performance of the four strategies in the two-stage
game.3 One-time policy improvement performs better by guaranteeing an expected payoff
of 27. The two strategies differ conceptually only at the first stage as how she plays when
using a one-time policy improvement strategy is dependent on type of security system. If
the security system is of type I, she selects DCII with probability .92. If the security system
3There are games where playing non-revealing is optimal for all n.
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is of type II, she selects DCII with probability 1 . At stage two, she selects the config-
uration DCII with probability .96, which is independent of the actual type of the system.
An defender that chooses to use her dominant strategy, which requires her to play hon-
estly, at each stage of the game yields her an expected payoff of 39, which outperforms
the two previously mentioned strategies. Perpetual policy improvement yields the defender
the highest reward, 53, of the four strategies in consideration. At the first stage of perpet-
ual policy improvement, the defender plays the same way she would have played had she
chosen one-time policy improvement. However, the key difference is at the second stage.
Instead of playing non-revealing as with the former strategy, the defender selects the defen-
sive configuration that corresponds to the actual system type she is defending. The optimal
payoff for this game is 63.
Figure 2: Non-revealing strategy payoff u(p) for security game
3.7.2.2 N-stage game
We discussed the performance of the four strategies in the two-stage case in the previous
section and will now examine their performance as N grows large. The expected payoff
for the dominant strategy converges asymptotically to 2 and has the worst performance of
the four strategies for large N. This is because the attacker can readily learn the type of
security system as the defender does not play deceptively. The attacker can then use this
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knowledge to select an attack action that is best suited for to the actual type of the system..
An optimal non-revealing strategy performs better than the dominant strategy because the
attacker is unable to learn any additional information about the system by observing the
defender’s action at each stage. As a consequence, the attacker has uncertainty on the most
suitable attack action. An defender who chooses this strategy can therefore guarantee a
payoff of 18 at every stage. An immediate consequence of this guarantee is that an defender
can achieve a game payoff of 18 for games of any length. Policy improvement methods
have the best performance of the four strategies for large N. Both methods have identical
behavior and converge asymptotically to optimal and yields a payoff of 23. At stage one of
the policy improvement methods, the defender behaves deceptively with some probability
that dependent on the type of security system. For all stages thereafter, the defender plays
a non-revealing strategy that is independent of the security system’s type.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we assume that once the state of the world is selected, the selection remains
fixed throughout the duration of the game. Since the players can observe the moves of the
other player, each player’s knowledge about the past actions of the other changes. This
introduces a dynamic aspect to the game as the changing knowledge affects each player’s
beliefs about the fixed state of the world. Due to the difficulty of computing optimal policies
for the informed player, who knows the state, we introduce policy improvement methods
based on the ideas of receding horizon control to compute suboptimal strategies. We show
that the methods have tight lower bounds and can be computed by solving a linear program
whose complexity remains constant with respect to the number of game stages.
Stochastic games with asymmetric information are more general as the state of the
world can change during game play. These transitions can be controlled by either player or
both. In contrast to repeated games, where the value of the game always exists, the value
may not exist in stochastic games when the uninformed player controls the transitions.
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However, the key issues and ideas of information exploitation and revelation discussed
in the special case, repeated games, are relevant to stochastic games. In particular, com-
puting optimal policies to determine the optimal amount of information to exploit is also
prohibitive in stochastic games.
We extend the policy improvement concepts that we applied to repeated games to
stochastic games in the next chapter to address the complexity issues in that setting. We
were able to incorporate the ideas of non-revelation in our policy improvement methods for
the repeated games. However, a key non-revelation result that we exploited is that if the
informed player plays non-revealing, the uninformed player’s beliefs about the state of the
world does not change. In stochastic games, the beliefs can change even when the informed
player uses a non-revealing strategy. Therefore, we will explore the concept of minimally
revealing strategies and use this strategy as a baseline policy for policy improvement meth-
ods for stochastic games. Similar to the repeated games, we are interested in establishing
bounds on the performance of these methods.
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CHAPTER 4
STOCHASTIC GAMES WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
4.1 Introduction
In a repeated game, the state of the world is randomly selected by nature and remains fixed
throughout the duration of the game. A stochastic game is a repeated game where the state
can change from stage to stage according to a transition that is dependent on the current
state and the moves of both players. Of interest, in this chapter is the scenario where one of
the players has superior information in the stochastic game and also solely controls the state
transitions. This scenario creates a complication for the informed player. The complication
is that she1 must decide when and how to use her private information. Note that by using her
private information, she also reveals that information to player II, the uninformed player.
In their seminal work, Aumann and Maschler studied the special case, repeated games with
asymmetric information, where every state is absorbing. This work provides insights into
the issues that an informed player must address when playing against an opponent that can
observe moves and use that information to better estimate the state of the world. Although
stochastic games with asymmetric information are more general than the repeated case, the
ideas and formulations that Aumann and Maschler introduce extend to the stochastic case.
The computational challenges of computing an optimal strategy for the repeated case also
extend to the more general stochastic case.
4.1.1 Related Work
Since computing optimal policies for stochastic games with asymmetric information is
prohibitive, there is work that considers computing suboptimal policies. Chang and Markus
[41] consider a receding horizon approach for two-person zero-sum Markov Games. In
their work, the minimizing player selects a “small” horizon and solves the game with the
1In this chapter, we will refer to the informed player as “she” and the uninformed player as “he”. The
assignment of “he” and “she” was arbitrary and was done for the purpose of clarity.
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finite horizon (called the subgame) under the assumption that the maximizer makes her
decision based on her best performance of the subgame. In [43], Raghavan and Syed
consider applying a policy-improvement algorithm to a special class of stochastic games
that have additive reward and additive transition structure. They show that for these games,
the policy improvement algorithm can generate optimal pure stationary strategies if they
exist. In [44] Raghavan explores single-controller stochastic games, where the transition
probabilities depend on the actions of the same player in all states. Raghavan shows that
non-zero-sum single-controller games can be reduced to linear complementary problems
and Lemke’s algorithm can be used to find a Nash equilibrium. In [45], Lakshmivarahan
investigate conditions under which two learning algorithms playing a zero-sum sequential
stochastic game arrives at optimal pure strategies. The algorithms are shown to converge
to the optimal pure strategies when they exist with probabilities as close to 1 as desired. In
[46], a decentralized learning algorithm is introduced. It is shown that all stable stationary
points of the algorithm are Nash equilibrium for the game. For two special cases it is shown
that the algorithm always converges to a desirable solution.
4.1.2 Contributions of the Work
We consider single-controller stochastic games with asymmetric information and address
the complexity issues for both finite horizon and infinite horizon games by deriving a sub-
optimal policy based on the concept of policy improvement. Policy improvement is a dy-
namic programming technique that first considers an initial policy, referred to as a baseline
policy, that is easily implementable. Through an iterative process, the performance of the
baseline policy is compared to that of other policies from a set of candidate policies. If a
candidate policy performs better, it becomes the new baseline policy. The baseline policy
we consider is a minimally revealing policy, i.e., one that completes ignores superior infor-
mation. The improved policy, which is implemented in a receding horizon manner, strate-
gies for the current stage while assuming a minimally-revealing policy for future stages.
We derive bounds on the guaranteed performance of the improved policy. Last, we show
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that the improved policy can be computed by solving a linear program whose complexity
is constant with respect to the game length.
4.1.3 Outline
The outline for the rest of this chapter is as follows. In Section 4.2, we review basic def-
initions, concepts, and results for stochastic games. In Section 4.3 we introduce single-
controller stochastic games with asymmetric information. We consider two classes of
these stochastic games in this section, where the player who has superior information also
controls the state transitions. In Section 4.4 we present the main results of this chapter.
Specifically, we show how policy improvement methods can be applied to single-controller
stochastic games with asymmetric information and can provide guarantees on the expected
payoff of player I. In Section 4.5 we present receding horizon heuristics and discuss the
performance of the heuristics. Last, we present simulations in Section 4.6 that demonstrate
the main results of this chapter.
4.2 Preliminaries on Stochastic Games
4.2.1 The Model
A zero-sum stochastic game G is specified by a finite state space Ω, action sets S and J, a
map q : Ω×S×J 7→ ∆(Ω), and a reward function g : Ω×S×J 7→ R. The standard hypothesis
that will be assumed is that the play, including the current state, is public. Therefore, the
initial state ω1 and the subsequent states are known by both players. It is assumed that both
players can observe the moves of the other and that each player has perfect recall about the
previous history hn. At each stage, both players select a move, sn ∈ S for player I, jn ∈ J
for player 2. The next state ωn+1 is selected according to the distribution q(· | sn, jn, ωn) on
Ω.
4.2.2 Strategies
For n = 1, 2, . . . , let Hn=[Ω × S × T ]n−1 × Ω be the set of possible histories at stage n.
Then hn ∈ Hn is a sequence (ω1, s1, t1; s2, t2; . . . ;ωn−1, sn−1, tn−1;ωn) of moves of the two
56
players in the first n − 1 stages of the game and the states. Let X = ∆(S ) and Y = ∆(T )
denote the mixed moves of player I and player II respectively where xkn = (x
k
n(s))s∈S . Let
ζn : hn 7→ S denote a pure strategy for player I and define ζ = (ζ1, ζ2, . . . , ζn). Simi-
larly let ψn : hn 7→ T denote a pure strategy of player II and define ψ = (ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψn).
Mixed strategies are probability distributions over pure strategies. Behavior strategies are
sequences of mappings from Hn to X and mappings from Hn to Y for player I and player II
respectively. Aumann [8] showed that mixed strategies can be equivalently represented as
behavior strategies for the stochastic games considered in this chapter. Therefore, the terms
behavior strategy and mixed strategy will be used interchangeably. Let σ and τ denote the
behavior strategies of players I and II respectively. Also let σ(hn) = (xn) ∈ X be defined as
the vector of mixed moves of player I at stage n.
Definition 4 A strategy is Markov if it depends only on the stage and on the current state.
Definition 5 A strategy is stationary if it depends only on the current state.
4.2.3 Payoffs
The payoff at stage n is denoted by gn, where gn = g(sn, jn, ωn). Let the game payoff
for the n-stage stochastic game be the average of the stage payoffs, denoted by Gn(ω).
Likewise, the payoff for the λ-discounted game and infinite game is denoted by Gλ and G∞
respectively.
4.2.4 Value of the Game
In [47], Shapley proved that the λ-discounted game has a value and that both players have
optimal stationary strategies. Kohlberg [48] then proved that all games with absobing states
have a value. Mertens and Neyman [49] introduced the following theorem which states that
all stochastic games have a value.
Theorem 8 [49] For every stochastic game and for every ε > 0, there exists a strategy σ
of player I and N > 0 such that for every n,n = N,N + 1, . . . ,∞ and for every strategy τ of
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player II,
Eσ,τ(x̄n) ≥ v∞ − ε (46)
where x̄∞ denotes limn→∞ inf x̄n.
As a consequence of the previous theorem, the strategy σ is ε−optimal in both the infinite
game and in all sufficiently long finite games.
4.2.5 Example: “Big Match”
A game that has played a fundamental role in the development of the stochastic game theory




Player I has a choice of playing T or B. However, as soon as she plays T the payoff
(with a “*”) is absorbing. Whatever the payoff receives at the first stage she plays T is the
payoff she receives for the remainder of the stages of the game, and therefore, the game is
essentially over. If player I plays B, the game is repeated and the stage payoff is given by
the entries of the matrix.
The recursive formula vn for this game is the following:
(n + 1)vn+1 = val
 n + 1 0nvn 1 + nvn
 (47)
An optimal strategy for player I is to play T with probability 1n+1 at the first stage in Gn.
The recursive formula for vλ is the following:
vλ = val
 1 0n = (1 − λ)vλ λ + (1 − λ)vλ
 (48)
The optimal payoff for the discounted game is vλ = 12 for all λ. Player I’s optimal strategy





both Gn and Gλ.
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4.3 Preliminaries on Stochastic games with Asymmetric Information
In this section, we will consider stochastic zero-sum games where player I controls the
transitions. Player I controls the transitions if, for every ω ∈ Ω and every s ∈ S , the tran-
sition q(· | ω, s, j) does not depend on j. Player II controls the transitions if the symmetric
property holds. The two classes of games we will consider are the following. The first class
is a family of stochastic games where each game has the same Markov chain, but different
payoffs. In these stochastic games, player I is informed of the specific stochastic game
that is selected by nature. Player II only knows the probability p of the finite family Gk,
k ∈ K, of stochastic games on the same state space. In the second class of games, player I
is informed of the initial start state ω and the subsequent states during the stochastic game.
Player II only knows the transition probabilities q of the Markov chain and the probability
distribution p of the initial starting state ω. The expected average payoff up to stage N for
these stochastic games with asymmetric information is defined by
γN(p, ω, σ, τ) = Ep,ω,σ,τ[ḡN],
where ḡN = 1N
∑N
n=1 g
k(ωn, in, jn) for the first class of games and ḡN = 1N
∑N
n=1 g(ωn, in, jn)
for the second class of games.
4.3.1 Definitions and Concepts
4.3.1.1 Concavification
Consider a continous function u : ∆(K) 7→ R, and let Cav[u(p)]) denote the functions
concavification. Specifically, let Cav[u(p)]) be the point-wise smallest concave function g
on ∆(K) satisfying g(p) ≥ u(p) ∀p ∈ ∆(K). In other words, g is the least concave function
over ∆(K).
4.3.1.2 Communication sets
For ω ∈ Ω denote
rω = min{n ∈ N, ωn = ω}
to represent the first visit to ω.
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Definition 6 Let ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω. ω1 leads to ω2 if ω1 = ω2 or if Pω1,σ(rω2 < +∞) = 1 for some
strategy σ of player I.
Definition 7 ω←→ ω′ iff ω leads to ω′ and ω′ leads to ω
Given ω ∈ Ω, denote Cω to be the communicating set that contains ω and define
S ω = {s ∈ S : q(Cω | ω, s) = 1}
Also define
S̃ ω = {s ∈ S : q(ω | ω, s) = 1}.
Actions in S ω (respectively S̃ ω) are called stay actions, and any state ω such that S ω = ∅ is
a null state. Denote the set of non-null states as Ωc.
Lemma 4.3.1 [9] ω ∈ Ωc if and only if there is a stationary strategy xCω such that Cω is a
recurrent set for x
Proof: First start with direct implication. Let ω ∈ Ωc. For ω′ ∈ Cω, define xω′ ∈ ∆(A) by
xω′ =

0 s < S ω′
1/|S ω′ | s ∈ S ω′
(49)
and let x be any stationary strategy that coincides with xω′ in each state ω′ ∈ Cω.
Lemma 4.3.2 [9] Assume player I controls the transitions. Let ω ∈ Ω and ω′ ∈ Cω. If
one of the players can achieve a payoff φ in Γ(p, ω), they can also achieve a payoff of φ in
Γ(p, ω′).
Proof: Assume first that player I can guarantee φ in Γ(p, ω). Let σ be a strategy that
guarantees φ− ε in Γ(p, ω′), and let σ∗ be the strategy that plays xCω until rω, then switches
to σ. In the game Γ(p, ω′), the strategy σ∗ guarantees φ − ε′ for each ε′ > ε.
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Now assume that player II can guarantee φ in Γ(p, ω), but assume to the contrary that
he cannot guarantee φ in Γ(p, ω′) for some ω′ ∈ Cω. Since player II cannot guarantee φ in
φ in Γ(p, ω′), there is ε > 0 such that for every strategy τ of player II and every N there
is a strategy στ,N of player I and an integer nτ,N such that γnτ,N(p, ω
′, στ,N, τ) > φ + ε.
Let τand N be given. Let σ∗ be the strategy of player I defined as follows. Play xCω until
stage rω′ , then switch to στν,M, where τν is the strategy induced by τ after stage ν, and M is
sufficiently large so that Pω,xCω (rω′ < M) > 1 −
ε
2 . Since there exists an n
′ ≥ N such that
γnτ,N(p, ω, σ
∗, τ) > φ + ε/2, there is a contradiction.
4.3.1.3 Minimally revealing strategies
Denote Γ̂R(p, ω) to be the stochastic zero-sum game with initial state ω, state space Cω,
reward function
∑
k pkgk, action sets S ω at each state ω′ ∈ Cω and transition function in-
duced by q. Similarly denote Γ̃R(p, ω) to be the n-stage stochastic zero-sum game with
initial state ω, state space Cω, reward function
∑
k pkgk and action sets S̃ ω. Note that the
action set consists of stay actions. Therefore, the game play never leaves ω. For the games
Γ̂R(p, ω) and Γ̃R(p, ω), if ω is a null state (e.g. the action set is empty), set û(p, ω) = −∞
and ũ(p, ω) = −∞ respectively.
4.3.2 Family of Stochastic Games (Level 2)
4.3.2.1 The Model
A zero-sum stochastic game with asymmetric information is described by a finite collection
Gk, k ∈ K of stochastic games on the same state space with a probability distribution
p ∈ ∆(K). pk denotes the probability stochastic game Gk is selected. We assume that both
players are told the next state ωn+1 and the move of the other player. The specific game Gk
is chosen by nature from the probability distribution p and the outcome of the selection is
told only to player I. We assume that the probability distribution p is public knowledge. The
game is then played over several stages. At each stage n ∈ N, the players simultaneously
choose an action s ∈ S and j ∈ J. ωn+1 is drawn according to q(· | ωn, in, jn). Note that
since the transition are determined by qk, player II’s beliefs about k can change even if
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player I uses a non-revealing strategy (i.e. xk = xk
′
∀ k, k′) The game will be parametrized
by the initial distribution p and the initial state ω, and will be denoted by Γ(p, ω)
Definition 8 Player I can guarantee φ ∈ R in the game Γ(p, ω) if, for every ε > 0 there
exists a strategy σ of player I and N ∈ N such that
∀τ,∀n ≥ N, γn(p, ω, σ, τ) ≥ φ − ε
Definition 9 Player II can defend φ ∈ R in the game Γ(p, ω) if, for every ε > 0 and every
strategy σ of player 1, there exists a strategy τ of player II and N ∈ N such that
∀n ≥ N, γn(p, ω, σ, τ) ≤ φ + ε.
4.3.2.2 Optimal strategies
Let the value of the infinite game be denoted by v. Also let (p, ω) ∈ ∆(K) × Ω be given.










v | ω′, s
] }
(p̃e, ωn), (50)
where p̃e ∈ ∆(K), αe ∈ [0, 1], for e = 1, . . . , |K| + 1, such that
∑
e αe = 1 and
∑
e αe p̃e = pn
[9]. An optimal strategy for player I is then the following. If Gk is the game that was




. Player I plays a stationary strategy that guarantees ũ(pe, ωn) in the restricted





v | ω′, s
]






v | ω′, s
]
}( p̃e, ωn) = E
[
v(pe, ·) | ω′, s
]
for some ω′ ∈ Cωn and s < S
′
ω, player I plays the stationary strategy xCωn until the game
reaches the state ω′. At ω′, he plays the actions s, and then he recursively switches to a
strategy that guarantees v(pe, ·).
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4.3.2.3 Value of the Game
In repeated games, there exists a value V that can be guaranteed by player I and defended
by player II. However, in stochastic games this value does not always exist. Specifically,
both the min-max and max-min value can exist but may differ. In [9] it was shown for
the case where player I controls the transitions, a value always exists. However, for games
where player II controls the state transitions, their are cases where the value does not exist.
4.3.2.4 Example
We will now consider examples of stochastic games that were presented and analyzed in
[9]. The first game has three states Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3} and two payoff functions K = {1, 2}.
The states ω2 and ω3 are absorbing. Player I can transition from ω1 to either ω2 and ω3
with equal probability by playing the move B. Let pω1 = 18 , where p
ω1 is the probability
that the initial starting state is ω1. The payoff matrices for the stochastic game are
k = 1
L M R
T 2/3 2/3 2/3
B 2/3 2/3 2/3
k = 2
L M R
T 2/3 2/3 2/3
B 2/3 2/3 2/3
ω1
L M R
T 1 1 1
B −1 −1 −1
L M R
T −1 −1 −1
B 1 1 1
ω2
L M R
T 4 0 2
B 4 0 −2
L M R
T 0 4 −2
B 4 0 2
ω3
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Let uωi(p) denote the one-stage optimal non-revealing payoff for stateωi. The non-revealing
payoffs in state ωi are then
u1(p) = 2/3
u2(p) = max{1 − 2p, 2p − 1}
u3(p) =

4p 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/4
2 − 4p 1/4 ≤ p ≤ 1/2
4p − 2 1/2 ≤ p ≤ 3/4
4 − 4p 3/4 ≤ p ≤ 1
Assume that the game starts in ω1. If player I chooses a completely revealing strategy
that exploits her information, her long-term payoff is 12 . This is because the probability
that she ends up in state ω3 is .50 and since player II will learn k, he can ensure that she
receives a payoff of no more than 0 in that state. Note that regardless of what action player
II selects in ω2, player I can guarantee a payoff of 1. Player I can do better by choosing
a non-revealing strategy. If player I plays the move T independent of k for all stages, the
state will remain in ω1 and player can achieve a payoff of 23 . A partially revealing strategy
yields player I the best long-term payout of 56
In the previous example, player I controls the transitions. If she plays T, she can remain
in state ω1. If she plays B, she will transition to either ω2 or ω3 with equal probability. We
will now consider an example where player II controls the transitions. As we will see in
this example, min-max is not equal to max-min, and therefore this particular game does not
have a value. The payoff matrices for this game are
k = 1
j1 j2 j3 j4 j5
T 4 0 0 0 0
B 0 0 0 0 0
k = 2
j1 j2 j3 j4 j5
T 0 0 0 0 0




j1 j2 j3 j4 j5
T 0 1 1 3 0
B 0 1 0 3 0
k = 2
j1 j2 j3 j4 j5
T 3 0 1 0 0
B 3 1 1 0 0
ω2
Note that |Ω| = |K| = 2, |I| = 2, and |J| = 5 for this example. The player II controlled
transitions are as follows. If he is in state ]omega1 and plays j5, the game will transition
to state ω2, where ω2 is absorbing. All other actions in state w1 are stay actions, where the
state does not change.
f (p) = uω1(p) =

3p 0 ≤ p ≤ 2 −
√
3
1 − p(1 − p) 2 −
√





3 − 1 ≤ p ≤ 1
(51)
and let
g(p) = uω2(p) = 4p(1 − p). (52)
where uω1(p) and uω1(p) are the optimal non-revealing payoff for the game in states w1 and
w2 respectively. The max-min value for this game is Cav[min{ f , g})] when the initial state
is w1, while the min-max value is min{Cav f , g}. If we consider the game with p = 1/2, the
max-min is equal to 3(2 −
√
3), while the min-max is equal to 4/5. Therefore, this game
does not have a value when p = 1/2.
4.3.3 Unknown Initial State
4.3.3.1 The Model
The game is specified by a state space Ω and a map q. p is a vector that denotes the
probability that ω′ ∈ Ω is selected as the initial state. The initial state ω′ is announced to
Player I, while player 2 knows only p. Denote gn to be the payoff at stage n, where
gn = g(ωn, sn, jn),
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ωn is the current state, and sn and jn are the moves of Players I and II respectively at stage
n. Let Gn(p) and Gλ(p) denote the n-stage and λ-discounted games respectively.
Let xω ∈ ∆(S ) denote a one-stage strategy. Let A denote the set of public signals and

































Note that (66) implies that player I has an optimal Markov strategy in Gn(p) and an optimal
Markov stationary in Gλ(p), where the state space is ∆(Ω). Also note that the recursive
formula does not allow player II to recursively construct optimal strategies because com-
putation requires knowledge of x, which is not known to player II, to compute the posterior
distribution.
4.4 Policy Improvement (Main Results)
Policy improvement is a dynamic programing approach that consists of first considering an
initial policy whose performance is known or can be readily computed. We will select a
minimally-revealing policy as our initial policy in this section and will refer to this policy as
the baseline policy. Next, a candidate policy is selected from some policy set. If the current
candidate policy performs better than the baseline policy, the candidate policy becomes the
new baseline policy. This new baseline policy is an improvement over the previous baseline
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policy, and therefore a policy improvement. This process can then repeated in an iterative
manner.
The policy improvement methods presented in this section are based on the ideas of re-
ceding horizon optimization. In the n-stage game, player I solves an optimization problem
over the interval [m, n], where m is the current stage and n is the total number of stages. We
assume that in the future stages, she will only consider minimally revealing strategies. This
assumption is key to reducing the complexity of the original dynamic programing formu-
lation vn(p, ω) because of the following idea. By playing a minimally revealing strategy in
all future stages, a lower bound on her expected future payout over the interval [m + 1, n]
can be computed by solving the optimization problem ũ(p, ω). Similarly in infinite horizon
games, the lower bound on the expected stage payout for all future stages is ũ(p, ω), assum-
ing player I plays minimally-revealing over all stages in the future. Note that ũ(p, ω) can
itself be computed by solving a linear program whose complexity is invariant with respect
to n.
Definition 10 In one-time policy improvement, player I strategizes for the first stage of the
game while assuming that she will play in a non-revealing manner in all future stages.
Theorem 9 The dynamic programing formulation for one-time policy improvement for
zero-sum stochastic games where player I controls the transitions is
















p̃+(p, µ, x, s, l, q, ω, ω′), ω′
)]
(54)
where xµq(s, l, ω′) =
∑
k∈K pkxk(s)uk(l)qk(ω′





for the n-stage game.
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Theorem 10 One-time policy improvement guarantees a payoff of Cav[ũ(p, ω)] for the n-
stage game. Equivalently ṽn(p, ω) ≥ Cav[ũ(p, ω)]
Proof:
First note that if the constraints xk,ω = xk
′,ω ∀k, k′ and s ∈ S̃ w are enforced then
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αl pl = p (60)
Note that the optimal value of (60) is Cav[ũ(p, ω)]. Therefore
ṽn(p, ω) ≥ Cav[ũ(p, ω)].
Q.E.D.
Algorithm 2 Perpetual policy improvement
1: procedure PERPPOLICYIMPROVE
2: initialize: set p1 = p
3: for m = 1→ N do
4: compute x̂m and µ̂ by solving one-time policy improvement LP with pm
5: select a move s for type k player using mixed strategy x̂km
6: select a signal l for type kplayer using mixed signal µ̂
7: update beliefs vector (i.e. pm+1 = p+(p, x̂, µ̂, s, l, ω))
8: end for
9: end procedure
Definition 11 In the perpetual policy improvement method, player I strategizes for the first
stage while assuming a non-revealing strategy in all future stages.
Corollary 4 Perpetual policy improvement guarantees a payoff of Cav[ũ(p, ω)] for the n-
stage game.
Proof: We will prove by construction. First, consider stage m = 1 and implement a one-
time policy-improvement strategy. By Theorem 10, there exists a mixed action x∗ and a
mixed signal µ∗ that guarantees a stage payoff of at least Cav[ũ(p, ω)] and a future payoff
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consider stage m = 2. Suppose signal l, move s, and state ω were observed at stage 1,
then the belief are plsω at stage 2 and the payoff for playing a non-revealing strategy is
u(plsω, ω). If player I plays non-revealing over the next n − 1 stages, she can guarantee
an expected payoff of u(plsω, ω). Suppose however that player I implements a one-time
policy-improvement strategy at stage m = 2. Note a key observation, which is that








Therefore, the worst that can happen to player I if she decides to implement a one-time pol-
icy improvement at stage m = 2 is that she gets the same payoff ũ(p∗lsω, ω) she would have
received if she hadn’t deviated from the original policy decided at stage m = 1. Consider
stage m. By a similar argument, perpetual policy improvement up to stage m guarantees an
expected payoff of at least Cav[ũ(p, ω)].
Theorem 11 One-time policy improvement guarantees a payoff of Cav[u(p, ω)] for the λ-
discounted game. Equivalently ṽλ(p, ω) ≥ Cav[u(p, ω)], where
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remains constant for all n ≥ 2.
Note that if the constraints xk,ω = xk
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p̃+(p, µ, x, s, l, q, ω, ω′), ω′
)]
s.t. xk = xk
′
∀k, k′
s ∈ S ω (63)
The constraints imply the following:∑
k,s, j,l
µk(l)pkxk,ω(s)yω( j)gk(ω, s, j) =
∑
l
µ̄(l)u(p+(p, µ, l), ω)
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(64)









αl pl = p (65)
Q.E.D.
Corollary 5 Perpetual policy improvement guarantees a payoff of Cav[u(p, ω)] for the λ-
discounted game.
Proof: By a similar argument used in Corollary 4, we can show that an optimal perpetual-
policy improvement strategy guarantees Cav[u(p, ω)].
Theorem 12 A one-time policy-improvement strategy that guarantees Cav[ũ(p, ω)]) can
be computed by solving a linear programing problem, and the computational complexity of
the linear program is constant with respect to the number of stages of the game.
Proof: We established in Theorem 10 the existence of a behavior strategy σ̃∗ that guaran-
tees a payoff to player I of Cav[u(p)]), where σ̃1 : k × ω 7→ ∆(L) × ∆(X), σ̃m≥2 : h̃1 × ω 7→
∆(X), and h̃1 is the history at stage m = 1 that include the observed signal and actions. Note
that we assume the worst case at stage 1, with respect to signal l, which is that player II can
also observe signal l and his strategy at stage m = 1 can be dependent on the signal. Recall
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that if player I uses behavior strategy σ̃∗, the best player II can do is also use a strategy τ̃∗
that has the form τ̃1 : l 7→ ∆(Y) and τ̃m≥2 : h̃1 × ω 7→ ∆(Y). Observe that γ
p
m(σ̃∗, τ̃∗) ≥
Cav[ũ(p)]) ∀m ≥ 1 and σ̃∗m = σ̃
∗
m′ ∀m,m





∗, τ̃∗) = (λ)γp1 (σ̃
∗, τ̃∗) + (1 − λ)γp2 (σ̃
∗, τ̃∗),
where λ = 1n . It is sufficient then to solve for the weighted two-stage game, where λ =
1
n ,
to compute a strategy for the n-stage game that guarantees Cav[ũ(p)]. For the optimal
strategy at stage m ≥ 3, let σ̃∗m = σ̃
∗
2. Since this game has perfect recall (e.g. Past histories
are perfectly remembered by each player), we can use Aumann’s result on the equivalence
of behavior and mixed strategies. Specifically, the behavior strategy σ̃∗ of player I can be
equivalently represented as probabilities on pure strategies ζ̃ where ζ̃1 : k × ω 7→ l × s, and
ζ̃m ≥ 2 : h̃1 ×ω 7→ s are pure strategies for player I at stage 1 and stage m ≥ 2 respectively.




i, ψ̃ j) for strategy pair (ζ̃ i, ψ̃ j), we can solve for the zero-sum game M̃ using linear
programming methods and derive a behavior strategy σ̃∗ that guarantees player I Cav[ũ(p)].
Equally important is that the size of the strategy sets for both players are independent of the
stages n of the game. Therefore M̃ is invariant with respect to n and so is the computational
complexity of the linear program.
Corollary 6 An optimal strategy for the infinitely repeated game can be computed by solv-
ing a LP.
Proof: Construct a matrix M̃ as in Theorem 12 with λ = 1. After solving M̃ using LP
methods, an optimal behavior strategy σ̃ can then be derived that guarantees an optimal
payoff of Cav[u(p)] for infinitely repeated games.
4.5 Heuristic Receding Horizon Policies
In this section, we consider applying receding horizon optimization methods to the class
of stochastic games where player II has uncertainty about the current state of the world ω.
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Note that these games were discussed in Section 4.3.3. Recall that the recursive formulation

















Similar to the repeated games, the complexity of evaluating the Bellman’s equation can be





minimally revealing policies for the informed player, we were able to achieve an exact,
non-recursive, and non-trivial function to compute the cost-to-go for repeated games and
a non-trivial lower bound estimate for the level 2 class of stochastic games discussed in
Section 4.3.2.
Unfortunately the technique of assuming minimally revealing policies does not provide
us with a reasonable and non-trivial cost-to-go function for the class of games considered
in section. However, we can still apply the ideas of receding horizon optimization to this
problem. We can make the following assumption. We will assume that the payoff player I
receives for playing a minimally revealing policy from stage m + 1, she also receives that
payoffs for stages m + 2, m + 3, . . .N. This assumption does not hold generally because
player II’s beliefs pm at stage m can change significantly even if player I plays minimally
revealing. Consider the stochastic game illustrated in Figure 3 as an example of such a
scenario. Observe that for any distribution p of initial states, the beliefs of player II from
stages m ≥ 2 onward will be p(ω2) = 1. This change in beliefs of player II occurs because
of the transition probability q for the game. No matter where the game starts at stage m = 1,
the game will transition and remain in state ω2 in all future stages. Therefore, player II’s
beliefs can change significantly even when player I uses a minimally revealing strategy.
4.5.1 Receding Horizon Formulation




















Figure 3: Stochastic game where player II’s beliefs can change significantly even when player
I uses a minimally revealing strategy
Observe that the key difference between equations (66) and (67) is the cost-to-go function,




p,x for the receding horizon formulation. Note
that we can also consider a m-step receding horizon formulation. Similar to the 1-step
formulation, the m-step formulation would approximate the future payoffs as the average
of the next m stages where we assume that a minimally revealing strategy is played dur-
ing those stages. Although an m-step formulation can be more favorable than the 1-step
formulation and offers significant computational savings with respect to the computation
of optimal policies, the computational complexity still grows substantially with each addi-
tional “look-ahead step” in the future.
4.5.2 LP Formulation of Receding Horizon Optimization
The m-step receding horizon optimization problem (i.e. equation (67)) can be formulated
as a linear program. We will consider the case where m = 1. However, a similar process
can be followed for arbitrary m. The formulation is similar to that of Theorem 12. The
strategies for player I are σ̃1 : ω 7→ ∆(X) and σ̃m≥2 : h̃1 × ω 7→ ∆(X), and the strategy for




The following example demonstrates how policy improvement can be applied to stochastic
games with asymmetric information to compute suboptimal solutions that have guarantees.
As usual, player I is the row player and maximizer, and player II is the column player
and minimizer. In policy improvement, player I’s objective is to strategic for the current
stage of the stochastic game, while assuming a non-revealing payoff in future stages. We
will consider the n-stage stochastic game where the game payoff is an average of the stage
payoffs. The game has two states Ω = {ω1, ω2}. there are two possible payoff functions
(e.g. K = 1, 2). The probability distribution over K is initially assumed to be uniform.
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Payoff structure for the game is the following:
k = 1
L C R ω+
T 4 0 2 −
M 4 0 −2 −
B 1/3 1/3 1/3 ω2
k = 2
L C R ω+
T 0 4 −2 −
M 0 4 2 −
B 1/3 1/3 1/3 ω2
ω1
L C R ω+
T 5 5 0 −
M 1/4 1/4 1/3 −
B 0 0 0 −
L C R ω+
T 0 0 0 −
M 1/3 1/4 1/4 −
B 0 5 5 −
ω2
In this game, player I has two stay actions in ω1 , which are T and B. Recall that playing a
stay action keeps the game in the current state with probability 1. Selecting action M will
transition the game to state ω2 with probability 1. In state ω2, all actions are stay actions
and ω2. Therefore, ω2 is said to be absorbing.
4.6.2 Discussion
We will discuss the performance of four possible strategies in this section. These strategies
are dominant strategy, non-revealing strategy, one-time policy improvement, and perpetual
policy improvement. We will first consider the case where N = 2 and then proceed to
discuss the performance of these strategies as N grows large. We will assume that the game
starts at state ω1.
4.6.2.1 Two-stage game
A strategy that player I can consider is to play an optimal non-revealing strategy. This
strategy consists of player I selecting action B at stage m = 1 for a stage payoff of 1/3 and
selecting actions T and B with equal probability for stage m = 2 that has a stage payoff
of 1.25. The expected game payoff for non-revealing is .7917. Player I can achieve a
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game payoff of 1 for playing her dominant strategy. Note that in this context, the dominant
strategy is a greedy strategy. In state ω1, she will play T if k = 1 and B if k = 2 and
will achieve a stage payoff of 2. With this strategy the game remains in state ω1 at stage 2
and since the dominant strategy if fully revealing, player II will know whether the payoffs
are of type 1 or 2 and can ensure that player I achieves a stage payoff of 0 and a game
payoff of 1. Policy improvement also guarantees a game payoff of 1. At stage 1, player I
plays T with probability .75 if k=1 and B with probability .75 if k=2. At stages 2 she plays
non-revealing, which guarantees a stage payoff of 1.
4.6.2.2 N-stage game
The dominant strategy has the worst performance and converges asymptotically to 0 with
respect to the number of stages in the game. The non-revealing strategy performs better by
guaranteeing a game payoff of .7917. Policy improvement performs the best by guarantee-
ing a game payoff of 1.
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CHAPTER 5
CYBER ATTACK FORECAST MODELING USING A
GAME-THEORETIC FRAMEWORK
5.1 Introduction
A reactive mindset is often the status-quo in the security community. Consider popular se-
curity products that include intrusion detection systems (i.e. Snort) and anti-virus software
as examples.1 In the case of anti-virus (AV) software, the typical scenario is the following.
First, new malware is developed by cyber hackers and then tested against popular versions
of AV software tools.2 Testing malware against AV tools virtually guarantees that new mal-
ware will initially go undetected. Next, the malware infects computing devices, and after
some period of time has elapsed, which can range from days to years, AV signatures are de-
veloped by the AV vendors (i.e Symantec, Kaspersky, and McAfee).3 This cat-and-mouse
pattern then repeats itself and can be observed within and across the security community.
Reactive security methodologies are effective against novice adversaries because these
adversaries typically use off-the-shelf tools and implement popular hacking techniques.
In contrast, the pioneering adversaries are able to push both cyber-hacking and security
frontiers forward by developing new malware, designing advanced hacking techniques and
methodologies, and challenging security researchers and practitioners to match their inge-
nuity.4 Measures and approaches that are forward looking and predictive are needed to
combat these adept adversaries and to address advanced persistent threats (APTs). Proac-
tive security is an approach that has the potential to address the problems that adept and
well funded adversaries present.
1A consequence of reactive security tools is that once a threat has been detected, damage has been done
and costs have been incurred.
2Websites such as http://www.virustotal.com can test malware against over 44 different AV
tools. Although these sites are intended for security professionals, they can also be used by hackers.
3Flame malware that was discovered in May 2012 had been operating in the wild since February 2010.
4Malware developers have introduced polymorphic viruses that mutate the machine code of the virus
after each execution. This polymorphism feature is designed to defeat AV tools that look for patterns in new
viruses that match older versions of the viruses.
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Actionable cyber-attack forecasting is a proactive approach that is considered in this
thesis. The objectives of actionable cyber-attack forecasting are to learn an attacker’s be-
havioral model, to predict future attacks, and to select appropriate countermeasures to pre-
vent future attacks. Impediments that have prevented the realization of reliable cyber-attack
forecasting include, but are not limited to, difficulty in modeling the adversary in an an-
alytical framework and the computational complexity of analyzing the model to forecast
attacks. Computational complexity issues will be addressed in this chapter.
5.2 Related Work
Previous work to address forecasting challenges, where uncertainty exists about the capa-
bilities of an attacker includes the work of Alpcan et al. and You et al. In [50], Alpcan et
al. model the interaction between attackers and an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) us-
ing a stochastic (Markov) game. The defender operates the IDS and has uncertainty about
the attacker’s intent. Tools that include value iteration are used to solve Markov Decision
Processes. In [51], You et al. describe how to model cyber-security problems that consider
the interaction between an attacker and a defender in a two-player zero-sum game. They
illustrate how the Nash and Bayesian Equilibria can be used to predict the behavior of an
attacker and to analyze the interaction between attacker and defender. You et al. suggest
that linear programs could be used to solve these problems.
Similar to You et al., cyber-security problems are also modeled as Bayesian zero-sum
games in this chapter. Computational methods are introduced to approximate solution to
cyber-security problems. A key feature of these methods is that the solution can be com-
puted by solving a linear program whose complexity is invariant with respect to the number
of stages of the zero-sum game. These computational methods also have tight lower bounds
on their performance that converge asymptotically to optimal with respect to the number of
stages of the game.
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5.3 Outline
The outline of the remainder of this chapter is as follows. In Section 5.4, iCTF20105, a
cyber-security challenge problem, will be discussed. In Section 5.5, asymmetric informa-
tion games6 will be introduced and basic concepts and definitions will then be discussed.
In Section 5.6, adversarial models for capture-the-flag (CTF) will be developed and tech-
niques to reduce the complexity of the models will be explored. The CTF problem will
then be formulated as a security game with asymmetric information in Section 5.7. Last,
simulations will be used to demonstrate how the models and techniques developed in this
chapter can be used to learn the behavioral model of an adversary, to predict future attacks,
and to launch appropriate countermeasures.
5.4 iCTF2010
5.4.1 Overview
Security researchers at the University of California Santa Barbara (UCSB) host a live
capture-the-flag tournament each year [52]. The 2010 version of this tournament, called
iCTF2010, will be considered in this chapter. There are typically over 900 participants in
the tournament, and the participants are hackers from the international community. The
purpose of the tournament is to observe and analyze strategies and techniques of real hack-
ers and collect datasets that can be used in security research projects. iCTF2010 is designed
as an abstraction of real-word cyber-security scenarios. For instance, consider the security
system at Georgia Tech as a target. The various departments of Georgia Tech (i.e. ECE,
ME, etc.) are subsystems that are required to run certain services such as ssh, smtp, citrix,
to facilitate the computing needs of faculty, staff and students.7 The attacker’s objective is
5This challenge problem will be modeled as a strategic game.
6This game theoretic framework will be used later in the chapter to model the capture-the-flag (CTF)
problem as a security game.
7An operational state of each subsystem in this example can be defined as the services that are not offline
because of maintenance. Maintenance could consist of security patch updates and/or server upgrades that
effect a particular service.
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to successfully disrupt critical services based on partial information he8 receives about the
operational state of the system.9
The CTF challenge problem is abstracted as a controlled partially-observable stochastic
system, and each subsystem is modeled as a Markov chain. A complication for the attacker
is that he does not have full knowledge of the operational state. However, he can estimate
the state based on a subset of emitted signals that are correlated with the state transitions.
Given those estimates, he can then chooses an appropriate action that corresponds to the
critical services he desires to disrupt. The objective of the attacker is to cause maximal dis-
ruption to the overall system. In the proceeding section, a formal description of iCTF2010
will be presented. The original CTF challenge problem was modified in this chapter, and
these modifications will be discussed. The original CTF formulation captures aspects of
real-world cyber-security problems that include a dynamic security system whose behavior
is at least partially observable and an adversary that can potentially learn and predict the
system’s behavior. The modifications presented in this chapter incorporate an additional
characteristic of real-world cyber-security problems. This characteristic is a defender who
initially has some uncertainy about the capabilities and behavior of an attacker, but who




The target system is abstracted as a discrete-time finite state, finite output Hidden Markov
Model (HMM). The target system will be referred to as T composed of N subsystems
T(1),T(2), ...,T(N). The operational states of subsystem Ti are denoted by
A(i) = {a(i)1 , a(i)2 . . . , a(i)ni }.
8The attacker will be referred to as “he,” and the defender will be referred to as “she.” The assignment of
“he” and “she” was arbitrary and was done for the purpose of clarity.
9It will be assumed that each subsystem hosts its own services and is therefore not impacted by service
disruptions in other subsystems.
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The state space of the target system is
A = A(1) × A(2) × . . . × A(N).
The set of observation signals of subsystem Ti is denoted by
B(i) = {b(i)1 , b(i)2 . . . , b(i)mi }.
The observation signal of the attacker at every instant is an unordered N-tuple of output
symbols generated by the subsystems. Given the observation signal B̄ = {b̄1, . . . , b̄N} at
some instant, the attacker knows that there exists an ordering of the elements of the signal,
say (b̄σ(1), . . . , b̄σ(N)), where σ : {1, . . . ,N} → {1, . . . ,N} is a bijection, such that
(b̄σ(1), . . . , b̄σ(N)) ∈ B(1) × B(2) × . . . × B(N).
He may not know the particular ordering, but he can always perform some probabilistic
inference given the HMM abstraction. The output space of the target system is denoted by
B. After the states and outputs have been relabeled, they are denoted by A = {a1, . . . , an}
and B = {b1, . . . , bm}, where n =
∏N
i=1 ni and m is the number of unordered N-tuples of
output symbols generated by the subsystems.
It is assumed that the state transitions of each subsystem are independent from each
other. Let {(Xt,Yt)}t∈Z+ denote the state and output process of the given HMM. The statisti-
cal description of the model is then given by an initial distribution vector π, where
πi = Pr[Xt = ai], i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
and a set of m transition matrices {M[y1], . . . ,M[ym]} where
M[yk]i j = Pr[Yt+1 = bk, Xt+1 = ai | at = x j],
where k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
83
5.4.2.2 Attacker
The action set of the attacker is denoted by
S = S(1) × . . . × S(N)
and corresponds to the set of services he disrupts in each subsystem. A payoff structure
rµ,λ : X×S→ R is associated with the action pairs of the state. This payoff structure reflects
whether an attacker, based on his information, chose to disrupt a service that is relevant to
the current operational state of the system. The subscript µ reflects the skill level of the
attacker and λ is associated with the resources that the defender allocates to the system.
The notion of probing10 is relevant to the attacker’s problem. The payoff incurred at each
time step provides the attacker with additional information that can be used to estimate the
current operational state. Therefore, the attacker is faced with the problem of leveraging
short term payoff versus obtaining more accurate information about the current state that
will prove beneficial in the long run.
5.4.2.3 Defender
The defender’s objective in the challenge problem is to minimize the cost of an attack by
an adversary on the target system. Since an attacker’s goal is to target critical services,
the defender can allocate resources to protect these critical services from being disrupted.
Let λ j represent the amount of resources that the defender allocates to protecting service
s j. The likelihood of a successful attack on s j decreases as λ j increases. Deciding how
to allocate resources among the services can be challenging for the defender because of
her uncertainty about an attacker’s type. This resource allocation issue is discussed in
Section 5.7.2.2.
10The idea of optimal probing is an interesting topic that will be considered in future research.
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5.5 Asymmetric Information Games
5.5.1 Overview
In a repeated zero-sum game, two players (defender and attacker) repeatedly play the same
zero-sum game over several stages. It is assumed that while both players can observe the
actions of the other, only the attacker knows the specific opponent he is playing against.
Although the defender has uncertainty about the type of attacker she faces, she has a prob-
ability distribution of attacker types and can use her observation of the attacker’s actions
during game play to eventually learn the attacker’s type. The dilemma faced by an attacker
is how should he trade off the short-term reward by exploiting his private information ver-
sus the long-term consequences resulting from revelation of his type.
Classic work by Aumann and Maschler [10] derives a recursive formula for the value of
the game, which quantifies the exploitation tradeoff, and also derives the optimal policy for
the attacker. Aumann and Maschlers’ model for explicit computations of optimal policies is
prohibitive for games with multiple stages. In [53], this computational issue is addressed by
introducing methods to compute suboptimal strategies by solving linear programs whose
complexity is constant with respect to the number of stages. The methods from [53] are
discussed in Section 5.7.2.
5.5.2 Game Setup
5.5.2.1 Game Play
Two players repeatedly play a zero-sum matrix game over N stages. The attacker is the
row player and maximizer, and the defender is the column player and minimizer. There are
a finite set K of possible attacker types that the defender can face. A specific attacker is
chosen from this set to play against the defender. Let S be the set of pure strategies of an
attacker, and similarly define J to be the set of pure strategies of the defender. The payoff
matrix for an attacker of type k will be denoted as Mk ∈ R|S |×|J|. Before the initial stage
m = 1, nature selects an attacker type according to a probability distribution p ∈ ∆(K),
which is common knowledge. The outcome of this selection is not revealed to the defender.
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Once selected, the attacker’s type remains fixed over all stages of the game.
5.5.2.2 Strategies
Mixed strategies correspond to distributions over pure strategies. Let xkm ∈ ∆(S ) denote the
mixed strategy of an attacker of type k at stage m. In repeated play, this strategy can be a
function of the actions of both players during stages 1, ...,N. Likewise, let ym ∈ ∆(J) denote
the mixed strategy of the defender at stage m, which again can depend on player actions






denote the collection of mixed strategies for all
attacker types and for all states at stage m, and x = {x1, ..., xN} denote mixed strategies over









denote the expected payoff for the pair of mixed strategies (x, y) at stage m. The payoff for
the n-stage game is then defined as






5.5.3 Concepts and Definitions
5.5.3.1 Beliefs
Since the defender is not informed of the attacker’s type k, she can build beliefs on the type.
These beliefs are a function of the initial distribution p of attacker types and the observed
moves of an attacker. An attacker must therefore carefully consider his actions at each stage
as they could potentially reveal his type to the defender. To get a worse case estimate of
how much information an attacker transmits about his type through his actions, he models
the defender as a Bayesian player and assumes that the defender knows his mixed strategy.
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The updated belief p+ is computed as




where x̄(p, s) :=
∑
k∈K pkxk(s) and xk(s) is the probability that an attacker of type k plays
pure action s.
5.5.3.2 Non-revealing strategies
Revealing information is defined as an attacker selecting a mixed strategy that is dependent
on his type k. From (69), it follows that a mixed strategy xm at stage m does not change
the current beliefs of the defender if xkm = x
k′
m ∀ k, k
′. As a consequences, an attacker who
plays as if he is oblivious of his type, ensures that his opponents beliefs about his type do
not change.11












is the set of non-revealing strategies [6]. By playing an optimal non-revealing strategy at
each stage of the game, an attacker can guarantee a game payoff of u(p).12
Definition 12 Let Cav[u(p)] denote the point-wise smallest concave function g on ∆(K)
satisfying g(p) ≥ u(p) ∀p ∈ ∆(K).
5.5.3.3 Short-term vs. long-term payoffs



















11In stochastic games, it is possible for the defender’s beliefs about an attacker’s type to change even if an
attacker plays as if it is oblivious of its type.
12In [53], this idea of non-revelation was exploited to reduce the complexity of Aumann and Maschler’s
formulation.
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introduced by Aumann and Maschler [10], characterizes the value of repeated zero-sum
games with asymmetric information. Note that n is a non-negative integer. When n = 0,









which is the value of the one-shot zero-sum game.
A key interpretation of this formulation is that it also serves as a model of the tradeoff
between short-term gains and the long-term informational advantage. For each decision x1












It is worth pointing out that the computational complexity of finding the optimal deci-
sion x1 can be attributed to the cost of calculating the long-term payoff. Since the long-term
payoff is a recursive optimization problem that grows with respect to the game length, it
can be difficult to find optimal strategies for games of arbitrary length. This difficulty
is because the number of decision variables in the recursive optimization problem grows


















was introduced in [53] to address a complexity issue of the recursive formulation of the
value of the game. In this formulation, it is assumed that the informed player uses optimal
non-revealing strategies (i.e. u(p)) for all future stages. Therefore, the cost-to-go function
vn(p) in (71) can be expressed as u(p) in (73). As a consequence of the non-revealing
assumption, the computational complexity remains constant with respect to the number of
stages of the game.
Theorem 13 [53] A perpetual policy improvement strategy can be computed by solving a
linear program online at each stage of the game, and the computational complexity of the
linear program is constant with respect to the number of stages of the game.
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In [53], lower bounds on v̂n(p) were established. It was also shown that the lower bounds
were tight, and it was proved that v̂n(p) has asymptotic convergence to optimality with
respect to the number of stages n.
Theorem 14 [53] One-time policy improvement and perpetual policy improvement achieve
Cav[u(p)] and the optimality bounds are







pk(1 − pk) (74)
The computational complexity of the attacker models will be reduced by using the v̂n(p)
formulation described in Section 5.5.3.3.
5.6 Attacker Modeling and Complexity Reduction
A basic adversarial model should addresses the following questions about a specific adver-
sary:
1. What are its skills? (Skillset/Capabilites)
Since each critical service can require specific technical skills to be disrupted, what
is the probability that an attacker can successfully disrupt service s j?
2. What is its intent? (Intent)
Is the ultimate goal of an adversary to prevent the success of the security system
under consideration or just to create general disruption?
3. How patient is the adversary? (Patience)
Is the attacker greedy, or is it patient and willing to forgo an immediate gain to
maximize its long-term payoff?
4. How does it build beliefs about the system’s current state? (Beliefs)
Is computing the system’s belief function computationally prohibitive? If so, what
technique does the adversary use to approximate the belief function?
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5. How does it make decisions based on its state estimates? (Strategies)
Given an estimate of the system, will an adversary disrupt critical services of the
most likely operational state or disrupt services that maximize its expected payoff?
In the adversarial models developed in this section, assumptions will be made that allow
the main ideas of attacker modeling and complexity reduction techniques to be conveyed in
a clear and accessible manner. These assumptions serve as intermediate steps that enable
the exploration of the prominent issues in modeling an adversary. The assumptions are
as follows: 1) Available actions of the attacker and the probability distribution of attacker
skill types are public knowledge. 2) Intents of the attacker are zero-sum. 3) The Attacker is
greedy. 4) The worst case with respect to the attacker’s computational ability is considered
(i.e. it is only prohibitive for the defender to computer the belief function of the system).
5.6.1 Capabilities
An attacker’s type will be defined as his skill level at disrupting a set of services. The skill
level will be represented as a vector, where the jth component of the vector represents the
attackers ability to disrupt service j. The values of the skill vector are in the range between
0 and 1, where 1 is expert skill and 0 is no skill at disrupting service s j.
5.6.2 Intent
The ultimate objective of the adversary may be unknown. Although many cyber hackers
aim to profit from their attacks, other hacker groups such as Anonymous employ denial of
service attacks to make political statements and to seek publicity. Therefore, an approach
that is used in this chapter to address the uncertainty of the adversaries objective is to con-
sider the worst case with respect to the defender. In particular, the problem is modeled as a
zero-sum game (i.e. a reward α for the attacker is a corresponding cost α to the defender).
This zero-sum assumption allows performance guarantees to be made on security policies.
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5.6.3 Patience
One can model an adversary as having a discount factor λ on its future payoff. A discount
factor of λ ≈ 0 would then indicate a greedy adversary that heavily discounts the future,
while λ ≈ 1 would be indicative of an adversary that is a long-term player that heavily dis-
counts the present. An alternative interpretation of the discount factor is the patience of the
adversary. Modeling a patient adversary introduces a probing complication that is absent
in the greedy models considered in this chapter. Since a patient attacker may be willing to
defer an immediate reward, he can consider choosing actions that may provide him with
a better estimate of the current state of the security system. This improved estimate along
with the adversaries knowledge of the HMM can then be used to make a better prediction
of the future behavior of the system. The question that follows is when should he probe
and when should he attack. This is an interesting question that will be considered in future
research.
5.6.4 Beliefs & Strategies
An adversary’s decision to disrupt a particular service s j can be dependent on his ability
to disrupt service s j (i.e. his skill set), his payoff for disrupting service s j, and his beliefs
about the current operational state of each subsystem Ti. Computing the belief function
of the current state of the system T is prohibitive. Consider the following example as an
illustration. Suppose that a system T ′ is composed of N′ subsystems that each have 10 op-
erational states. The size of the state space of the system T ′ is the product of the individual
subsystems and is equal to 10N
′
, and the beliefs are probabilities of state combinations of
the subsystems, e.g. ∆(10N
′
). The worst case is assumed about the adversaries capabilities,
which is that he can compute the belief function of the system, while the defender can only
compute an estimate. Two techniques, quasi-beliefs and belief compression, will be intro-
duced in the subsequent sections to address the computational challenges of the defender.
These techniques can be used to calculate estimates of the belief function of the system T.
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5.6.4.1 Quasi-beliefs
The main idea of quasi-beliefs (QB) is the following. Instead of computing the true beliefs
of system T, e.g. ∆(10N), an estimate of the beliefs of each subsystem Ti can be computed
independently of the other subsystems T−i. An issue that arises with computing indepen-
dent beliefs of each subsystem is signal assignment. Recall that the attacker only observes
the collection of signals emitted from the subsystems. Therefore, he has uncertainty about
the mapping between each signal and the subsystem that emitted the signal. Algorithm 3,
detailed below, provides a method for estimating the likely mapping between signals and
subsystems.
Algorithm 3 Signal assignment
1: procedure SIGNALASSIGN
2: initialize matrix PS
3: while size(PS ) > 0 do
4: find the maximum element of PS
5: denote (i∗,m∗) as the position of the max element
6: assign signal ym∗ to subsystem Ti∗
7: remove row i∗ and column m∗ from matrix PS
8: end while
9: end procedure
Note that for the matrix PS at step 2 of Algorithm 3, each column corresponds to a signal ym,
each row corresponds to a subsystem Ti, and element (i,m) represents the probability that
signal ym was emitted from subsystem Ti. Also note that if there are more than one maximum
element at step 4, the tie is broken by randomly selecting a maximum element. The signal
assignment method is used in the quasi-belief greedy (QBG) algorithm ( Algorithm 4) that
is described below.
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Algorithm 4 QBG Strategy
1: procedure QBGSTRATEGY
2: start with set of individual subsystem beliefs
3: run procedure SIGNALASSIGN
4: update individual beliefs using assignment
5: attack services with highest expected reward
6: re-normalize beliefs given success/failure of attack
7: end procedure
5.6.4.2 Belief Compression
The point of departure is the statistical description of the HMM abstraction of the target
system. Let A = {a1, . . . , an}, B = {b1, . . . , bm} denote the state and output space respec-
tively. The statistics of the joint state and output process {(Xt,Yt)}t∈Z+ are encoded by the
initial distribution vector π, where
πi = Pr[Xt = ai], i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
and a set of m transition matrices {M[y1], . . . ,M[ym]} where
M[yk]i j = Pr[Yt+1 = bk, Xt+1 = ai | Xt = a j],
for k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let B∗ denote the set of all emitted finite strings
of observation signals including the empty sting ∅. Let v = vk . . . v1 stand for a string of
length k. Let 1n ∈ Rn denote the vector whose entries are all 1. Introduce the function
p : B∗ × Rn+ → [0, 1],
where
p[(v, π)] = 1Tn M[vk] . . . M[v1]π.
The function p is referred to as the probability function. It is used to compute the probabil-




Pr[Yk = vk, . . . ,Y1 = v1 | Xo = ai] πi.
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The value p[(v, π)] is computed recursively using the rule
p[(v, π)] = 1Tn Hk,
where Ht = M[vt] Ht−1, t ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and H0 = π. Consider also the functions
pco : Y × Y∗ × Rn+ → [0, 1], pcs : X × Y
∗ × Rn+ → [0, 1],
referred to as the conditional output probability and conditional state probability function.
The value pco[(b, v, π)] corresponds to the conditional probability of emitting the signal b
given that the signal v has been observed under the initial distribution π, i.e.
pco[(b, v, π)] =
∑
i∈{1,...,n}
Pr[Yk+1 = b | Yk = vk, . . . ,Y1 = v1, X0 = ai] πi.
Similarly the value pcs[(a, v, π)] corresponds to the conditional probability of being at state
a given that the signal v has been observed under the initial distribution π, i.e.
pcs[(a, v, π)] =
∑
i∈{1,...,n}
Pr[Xk = a | Yk = vk, . . . ,Y1 = v1, X0 = ai] πi.
The belief function is




Π[v, π]i = pcs[(ai, v, π)], i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.





At every time step the attacker chooses an action to maximize his instantaneous expected
reward. For s ∈ S let g[s] ∈ Rn where g[s]i = r[s, ai], i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Having observed the
signal v and following a greedy strategy the attacker is faced with the optimization problem
max
s∈S
< g[s],Π[v, π] > .
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The notion of belief compression is associated with projecting the dynamics of the given
HMM onto a lower dimensional manifold. Let n̂ < n, V ∈ Rn×n̂, U ∈ Rn̂×n with U V = In̂,
so that V U is a projection matrix. The parameters of a reduced complexity model are given
by
ĉT = 1Tn V, b̂ = U π,
Â[y] = U M[y] V, y ∈ Y.
Using the reduced complexity model one can determine a greedy strategy while performing
the relevant calculations on a n̂ dimensional space with obvious computational and storage
advantages. In particular, consider the function
p̂ : Y∗ × Rn → R,
where
p̂[(v, b̂)] = ĉT Â[vk] . . . Â[v1]b̂.
The value p̂[(v, b̂)] is computed recursively using the rule
p̂[(v, b̂)] = ĉT Ĥk,
where Ĥt = Â[vt] Ĥt−1, t ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and Ĥ0 = b̂. The function p̂ is a low complexity
surrogate for the probability function of the given HMM. Similarly consider the function










< ĝ[s], Π̂[v, π] > .
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The balanced truncation algorithm developed for HMM’s in [54] will be employed to
compute the compression matrix U and dilation matrix V . The reduction method is based
on stable numerical linear algebra tools employing the singular value decomposition and is
accompanied by an a priori bound to the approximation error. In other words, it leverages
the favorable features of Hankel norm based reduction techniques for linear time invariant
systems.
First one solves linear algebraic equations to obtain “gramian like” quantities Wc,Wo ∈




M[y]T Wo M[y] + 1Tn 1n, Wc =
∑
y∈Y
M[y] Wc M[y]T + π πT . (75)
Denote by Lo, Lc the Cholesky factors of Wo = LTo Lo and Wc = Lc L
T
c and consider the

















where Σ(1) = diag[σ1, . . . , σn̂], Σ(2) = diag[σn̂+1, . . . , σn] and σ1 ≥ . . . ≥ σn̂ > σn̂+1 ≥ . . . ≥



























The following error bound controls the approximation of the given probability function:√∑
v∈Y∗
(p[v, π] − p̂[v, b̂])2 ≤ 2(σn̂+1 + ... + σn).
The algorithm is demonstrated on a target system comprised from 3 subsystems used in the
iCTF, with |A| = 1331 and |B| = 680. The singular values σ1, . . . , σ1331 that control the
error bound are illustrated in Figure 4. There is a clear cut-off behavior indicating that a
choice of a reduced complexity model with 286 states is appropriate.
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Figure 4: Singular values σ1, . . . , σ1331 control the error bound.
Next it is demonstrated that the reduced complexity model delivers a very accurate
approximation to the conditional output probability function. The vector
(pco[b1, vk . . . v1, π], . . . , pco[b680, vk . . . v1, π])
conditioned on two trajectories vk . . . v1 of length 1000 is depicted in Figure 5. The bot-
tom row of Figure 5 corresponds to the exact model and the rows above it correspond to
approximations computed using the reduced order model. In both cases a reduced order
model of at most 286 states approximates this conditional probability within 0.1%.
One can use the reduced order model also to compute an approximation to the belief
function of the system and subsequently solve the attacker’s greedy optimization problem.
A reduced order model of 499 states depicted in Figure 6 delivers a very accurate approx-
imation to the belief function within 0.1% error. The belief function was computed for a
trajectory vk . . . v1 of length 1000. The bottom row corresponds to the exact model and the
rows above it correspond to approximations computed using the reduced order model. The
reduced order model led to the same choice of action in 96% of the instances when using
greedy optimization.
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Figure 5: A comparison of the conditional probability of the approximate systems (first three
rows) with respect to the exact system (bottom row).
5.7 CTF Security Game Formulation
In this section, iCTF will be formulated as a security game with asymmetric information.
Recall that these games were discussed in Section 5.5. In the formulation that will be in-
troduced in this section, it is assumed that only the attacker knows his opponent’s type.
Therefore, the information asymmetry of the iCTF security game is on the side of the
attacker. The next section will proceed with a discussion of the game play. Strategies avail-
able to the players will then be discussed. Last, prominent issues that each must consider
will be covered along with approaches to address those issues.
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Figure 6: A reduced order model of 499 states delivers a very accurate approximation to the
belief function within 0.1% error.
5.7.1 Game Play
5.7.1.1 One-shot game formulation
The one-shot game formulation of iCTF consists of two players, an attacker and the de-
fender. An attacker of type k is selected by nature before the start of the game from a
known distribution p of attacker types.13 The attacker’s objective in this game is to max-
imize his reward for attacking the security system T that was defined in Section 5.4.2.1.14
The attacker maximizes his reward by disrupting critical services that are needed by the
individual subsystems Ti of T . The attacker knows the specific services that are critical for
each state of the subsystem. However, he has uncertainty about the current state of each
subsystem Ti.
13Attackers differ in their ability to disrupt services, and an attacker’s type is defined by its skill vector.
14Conversely, the defender’s objective is to minimize its costs incurred by the attacker.
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An attacker can improve his estimate of each subsystem’s state by computing the belief
function of the system T . Since computing the belief function is computationally pro-
hibitive for systems with large state spaces, the defender can approximate the true belief
function by considering a state estimation technique discussed in Section 5.6.4. It is as-
sumed that the defender uses the quasi-beliefs in this chapter, although she could also use
an alternative technique (i.e. belief compression). A particular greedy strategy that an at-
tacker can consider is to disrupt services that maximize the expected payoff of an attacker
of his type. This greedy strategy will be referred to as the honest strategy. Alternatively,
an attacker can disrupt services that maximizes the payoffs of an attacker of another type.
This strategy will be referred to as the dishonest strategy. It may initially seem irrational
for an attacker to select a dishonest strategy because this strategy does not maximize his
immediate payoff. However, it will be demonstrated in the next section that choosing a
dishonest strategy can be rational and optimal.
The defender has finite resources that she can allocate to maintain the availability of
critical services. Dedicating more resources to a particular service s j decreases the likeli-
hood that service s j will be disrupted in the event that an attacker targets that service. At
the start of iCTF, she can select how these resources are allocated, and the resource alloca-
tion decision remains fixed until the completion of iCTF. This resource allocation decision
can be a function of the defender’s belief about an attacker’s type. In particular, she can
chose to do a best response allocation with respect to an attacker’s type or best respond to
an attacker’s type with some probability.
5.7.1.2 Repeated game formulation
It was assumed in the one-shot formulation that once a QBG policy is chosen by the attacker
and a resource allocation technique is chosen by the defender at the beginning of the game,
the selections by both players remain fixed throughout the duration of iCTF. In the repeated
game formulation, however, both players can reevaluate their decisions at specific intervals.
These intervals will be referred to as stages. At each stage, the security system S is reset
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to its initial state. However, each player’s knowledge about the other player’s past actions
is not reset. In fact, each player’s knowledge changes over time, affects his/her beliefs, and
introduces a dynamic aspect to this security game.
5.7.2 Player Concerns
In the previous section, it was discussed that each player’s knowledge is dynamic and
changes in time. An important objective of the attacker is to control the beliefs of the
defender about his type because knowledge of the attacker’s type can allow the defender
to make decisions that cost the attacker. Controlling the defender’s beliefs often involves
deceptive play by the attacker. An attacker of type k can elect to select a QBG strategy
of an attacker of a different type. (i.e. QBGk′ where k , k′). Because of the potential
for deception, it can be difficult for the defender to learn the attacker’s true type. In the
preceding sections, approaches for addressing each players concerns will be discussed.
5.7.2.1 Attacker
Recall that in Section 5.5.3.3 a formulation introduced by Aumann ad Maschler was dis-
cussed. This formulation can be used to model an attacker that optimally controls the
beliefs of the defender and to determine the optimal game payoff. As part of the discus-
sion, complexity issues that arose with using this formulation were mentioned. Policy-
improvement strategies will be used to address the complexity issues by approximating
the strategy selection of an optimal attacker. These policy-improvement strategies have
error bounds on their performance with respect to optimal strategies, and the performance
of the policy improvement methods converge asymptotically to optimal with respect to n,
the number of stages in the game. The one-time policy-improvement method will first be
discussed and then will be preceded by a discussion of the perpetual policy-improvement
method.
In one-time policy improvement, an attacker strategizes for the first stage of the iCTF
game while assuming that he will play in a non-revealing manner in all future stages.
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Perpetual policy improvement is an extension of one-time policy improvement. In the
perpetual policy-improvement method, the attacker strategizes for the current stage while
assuming a non-revealing strategy in all future stages at every stage. The perpetual policy-
improvement method involves solving an LP online, and the computational complexity of
the LP is constant with respect tho the number of stages of the game. Below is the perpetual
policy improvement algorithm.
Algorithm 5 Perpetual policy improvement
1: procedure PERPPOLICYIMPROVE
2: initialize: set p1 = p
3: for m = 1→ N do
4: compute x̂m by solving one-time policy improvement LP with pm
5: select a move s for attacker type k using mixed strategy x̂km




Learning an attacker’s true type can be challenging because he can play in a deceptive
manner [36]. If the defender knew the mixed strategy xk for each type of attacker k, then
learning an attacker’s type would be straightforward because the defender could follow
a standard Bayesian-update approach. Unfortunately, in the actual play of the game, the
defender does not know each attacker’s mixed strategy because this information is private.
Another approach that the defender can consider is solving a linear program to compute an
optimal defensive strategy.15 However, the complexity of the LP is exponential with respect
to n, the number of stages of the game. A payoff-based heuristic for learning an attacker’s
type will be introduced that is computationally tractable for arbitrary n and only depends
15Ponssard and Sorin [42] showed that zero-sum repeated games of incomplete information can be formu-
lated as linear programing problems to compute optimal strategies.
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on the information that is available to the defender. This information is namely the history
of the attacker’s actions.
The main idea behind the payoff-based heuristic is as follows. The defender’s belief of
an attacker of type k will be correlated with the actual game payoff of the attacker. After
each stage, the defender keeps track of what the overall game payoff would be for each
type of attacker. The game payoff for an attacker of type k at stage n, given history hn
will be denoted γ̃kn(hn). This payoff γ̃
k
n(hn) will be compared to the best possible payoff
that a type k attacker can achieve. The best possible payoff will be denoted by |Mk|, where
|Mk| := max
i, j
Mki, j. Without loss of generality, it will be assumed that each matrix M
k is





be a measure of the likelihood that an attacker is of type k given history hn. The belief










k(hn). To compute a best response strategy ỹ∗ for the defender given
the approximate belief p̃n at stage m, solve the optimization equation











As usual, this game consists of two players, an attacker and a defender. In this example, it
is assumed that there are two types of attackers (i.e. type I and type II) and each attacker
is uniquely defined by his skill vector. The probability distribution of attacker types is
uniform (i.e. pk = 12 for k = 1, 2), and there are two stages in this game. Matrix payoffs for











Note that an attacker of type I has the option of playing as his type by selecting QBGI
or playing deceptively by selecting QBGII . Similarly, a type II attacker can opt to play
either honestly or deceptively. The defenders available actions are to play a best-response
resource-allocation strategy for a specific attacker type (i.e BRI or BRII).
5.8.2 Discussion
The performance of four attacker strategies will be discussed in this section. These strate-
gies are dominant strategy, non-revealing strategy, one-time policy improvement, and per-
petual policy improvement. In the one-shot game, the optimal strategy for an attacker is to
behave as his type by selecting his dominant strategy. However, for games where n > 1,
this can be a suboptimal strategy because it can reveal the attackers true type to the defender
and cost the attacker the informational advantage. Specifically, in the two stage game, the
attacker can achieve a better payoff by selecting the perpetual policy-improvement strategy.
For games where N is large, the dominant strategy has the worst performance out of the
four strategies and the policy improvement strategies have the best performance.
5.8.2.1 Two-stage game
An optimal non-revealing strategy requires the attacker, regardless of his type, to play as
a type I attacker with probability .70 and to play as a type II attacker with probability .30
at each stage. This strategy rewards the attacker with a payoff of 18 and has the worst
performance of the four strategies in the two-stage game.16 One-time policy improvement
16There are games where playing non-revealing is optimal for all n.
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performs better by guaranteeing an expected payoff of 27. The two strategies differ concep-
tually only at the first stage, where the one-time policy-improvement strategy is dependent
on the attacker’s type. A type I attacker plays deceptively at stage m = 1 with probability
.92, while a type II attacker plays honestly with probability 1. At m = 2, an attacker plays
as a type II attacker with probability .96, which is independent of his type. An attacker that
chooses to use his dominant strategy, which requires him to play honestly, at each stage of
the game yields the attacker an expected payoff of 39, which outperforms the two previ-
ously mentioned strategies. Perpetual policy improvement yields the attacker the highest
reward, 53, of the four strategies in consideration. At the first stage of perpetual policy im-
provement, the attacker plays the same way he would have played had he chosen one-time
policy improvement. However, the key difference is at the second stage. Instead of playing
non-revealing as with the former strategy, the attacker behaves as his type in the second
stage of perpetual policy improvement.
5.8.2.2 N-stage game
The performance of the four strategies in the two-stage case was discussed in the previous
section. The performance of these strategies as N grows large will now be examined. The
expected payoff for the dominant strategy converges asymptotically to 2 and has the worst
performance of the four strategies for large N. This asymptotic converge happens because
the defender can readily learn the attacker’s type, since the attacker does not play decep-
tively. The defender can then use this knowledge to select a resource allocation scheme that
is a best response to his type. An optimal non-revealing strategy performs better than the
dominant strategy because the defender is unable to learn any additional information about
the attacker after observing his action at each stage. As a consequence, the defender has
uncertainty about which resource allocation scheme will perform best against the attacker.
An attacker who chooses this strategy can therefore guarantee a payoff of 18 at every stage.
An immediate consequence of this guarantee is that an attacker can achieve a game payoff
of 18 for games of any length. Policy improvement methods have the best performance of
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the four strategies for large N. Both methods have identical behavior and converge asymp-
totically to optimal and yields a payoff of 23. At stage one of the policy improvement
methods, the attacker behaves deceptively with some probability that is type dependent.
For all stages thereafter, the attacker plays a non-revealing strategy that is independent of
his type.
5.9 Remarks (Stochastic Game Extensions)
So far we have considered the cyber scenario where an attacker is randomly selected by
nature. The attacker selection along with the corresponding skill set of the attacker remains
fixed over all stages. We will now consider the scenario where the attacker’s skill set can
change during game play. Specifically, we will formulate the iCTF problem as a stochastic
game and use the results of Chapter 4 to analyze the problem.17
5.9.1 Stochastic game formulation
The scenario we will consider is the following. In state ω1, each attacker will have the
identical skill sets that was presented in the repeated game. The key difference between
that example and this example is that the skill set of the type I attacker will improve if he
selects the action QBG1; his skill at attacking service S 0 will improve from .15 to 1. This
skill change will be represented by the game transitioning from state ω1 to ω2. The Payoff
structure for the stochastic cyber-security game is the following:
17Explicit knowledge of the stochastic game results are not necessary for this section. We will use the




QBG1 23 375 ω2
QBG2 −92 69 −
k = 2
BR1 BR2 ω+
QBG1 −6 −28 ω2
QBG2 128 −20 −
ω1
BR1 BR2 ω+
QBG1 275 607 −
QBG2 −23 121 −
BR1 BR2 ω+
QBG1 −15 −17 −
QBG2 167 −15 −
ω2
5.9.2 Discussion
We will consider a setup with the following paramters. The probability that an attacker of
a particular type is selected will be assumed to be uniform. The game will be over two
stages. In the game with these parameters, an attacker can guranatee an expected payoff of
9 if he plays an action (QBG2) that keeps him in state ω1. Alternatively, the attacker can
change the state to ω2 by choosing the action QBG1. He can gurantee a payoff of at least
87. Note that the specific policy to achieve this payoff is perpetual policy improvement. For





The overarching theme of this thesis is to address computational complexity issues in the
domains of Game Theory and cyber security. In Game Theory, computing optimal policies
for asymmetric games are prohibitive. In cyber security, computational challenges have
inhibited the realization of reliable cyber-attack forecasting. We address these issues by
considering computable suboptimal polices with provable performance guarantees that are
based on the concepts of model predictive control.
6.1 Asymmetric Information Games
Game theory has seen wide-spread adoption as a tool to model conflict-resolution scenarios
and predict the likely strategies of decision makers. A classic conflict-resolution scenario is
the Prisoner’s dilemma, which captures how rational decision makers can resolve a conflict
by choosing actions that serve there selfish interest. It is assumed in the classic version
of Prisoner’s dilemma that all information is public, but what happens when one of the
decision makers has private information about the underlying state of the world? Works
that includes [10], [24] have been highly influential in formulating this scenario as a strate-
gic game and characterizing the equilibrium. Unfortunately, computing the equilibrium
strategy for these games is computational prohibitive because of the exponential growth in
complexity as the number of game stages increases.
The computational complexity problems that this class of games presents has not been
adequately addressed in the literature. Work that includes [36], [5], [6], [37] makes some
headway but is largely limited to exploring special cases. We address the complexity is-
sues of stochastic and repeated games by revisiting the dynamic programing formulation,
introduced by Aumann and Maschler, to pinpoint the cause of the complexity and consider
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ways of reducing it. A key observation is that the cost-to-go function of the DP is the pri-
mary contributor to the exponential computational growth. We reduce the complexity of
the cost-to-go by assuming non-revealing policies going forward instead of assuming opti-
mal policies. We then apply model predictive control concepts to the problem that enable
us to solve the problem as a linear program online at each stage of the game, where the
complexity of the LP remains constant for arbitrary game stages. We are then able to prove
that the suboptimal policies have bounds on their performance.
6.2 Cyber Security
Much research has been dedicated to formulating cyber-security problems as strategic
games to forecast a cyber-attack and predict the likely behavior of key decision makers.
This research includes the work of [55], [56], [57], [58], [59], [60], [61]. Impediments to
the realization of cyber-attack forecasting includes modeling and computational challenges.
Specifically, it is unclear of what the appropriate method for formulating a cyber security
problem as a game should be [52]. It can also be computationally difficult to analyze a
strategic game because of the complexity challenges of computing equilibrium strategies.
6.2.1 Modeling Cyber-security Problems
Our work in this thesis largely involves addressing computational challenges. However,
in Chapter 5, we consider a capture-the-flag challenge problem developed by security
researches at UCSB [52] and formulate this cyber-security scenario in a game theoretic
framework. The approaches that we used to frame the problem as a strategic game could
also be used for other problems. Since how something is modeled can significantly be in-
fluential in how difficult it is to analyze the model, choosing an appropriate model is also
very important with respect to computational considerations.
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6.2.2 Complexity Reduction
As was pointed out previously, there can be an intimate relationship between a particular
model that is chosen to model a security system and the computation required to analyze
the model. Therefore, how much one can reduce the overall computational complexity
is a function of the model. Given a game-theoretic formulation of the model, however,
we introduce methods in this thesis that can be applied to the strategic game formulation
that yields suboptimal policies that can approximate the behavior of an optimal attacker.
Having the ability to to predict an attacker’s behavior can better assist security researchers
in discovering vulnerabilities in security systems. This ability can also enable security
professionals and practitioners to be more proactive instead of reactive with respect to
cyber security.
6.3 Future Work
In this dissertation, we address the complexity challenges of forecasting a cyber-attack
by introducing complexity reduction techniques. The security system model that we used
for the cyber-attack forecasting was an experimental model constructed by security re-
searchers. We would like to next consider a real-world security system and model the
system in a game-theoretic framework. Although taking this next step in modeling a real-
world system is also challenging, this next step can potentially provide rich insights into
the performance of the system and unearth system vulnerabilities that may have been pre-
viously unknown and perhaps not considered. Modeling a real-world system could also
provide security researchers with tangible proof that formulating cyber-security problems
in an analytical framework has significant value to security practitioners. Incorporating the
reduction techniques presented in this research on a real-world system can make significant
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